This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed rms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the rm-size pay gap. We nd that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with rm size, certainty-equivalent pay decreases with rm size. In larger rms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about e ort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the rm-size gap in total compensation. Larger rms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coe cients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from di erent rms are individually signi cant, but their collective e ect on rm-size pay di erentials nets out.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most robust empirical ndings in labor economics is that pay increases with rm size (Oi and Idson, 1999) . This is also true in the executive labor market: Executives in large rms are paid 2.7 times as much as their counterparts in small rms. Recently, a number of papers have used this relationship between rm size and compensation to justify the increasing trend in executive compensation (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervi• o, 2008; Gayle and Miller, 2009b) . The literature on the rm-size pay premium has proposed three major behavioral reasons for the relationship between rm size and pay: monitoring cost, shirking, and demand for entrepreneurial talent. However, none of the papers on the rm-size pay premium in the executive labor market include all these possible explanations for the rm-size pay premium, nor do they assess their relative importance.
1 In labor markets, di erences in compensation arise from di erences in job characteristics, such as employment stability, the nature of the tasks, promotion opportunities, and the work environment. This paper develops a framework encompassing these job features to investigate the reasons for the rm-size pay premium in the executive labor market. This is the rst paper to explicitly analyze the problem in the context of a dynamic model of executive careers. It delivers several new empirical ndings relating rm size to compensation and interprets them within a uni ed conceptual framework.
We control for self-selection by executives across rms and ranks by extending the sorting model of Roy (1951) to incorporate nonpecuniary job utilities, agency issues, and human capital. In the model, executives make sequential job and e ort choices, taking into account the compensation, nonpecuniary bene ts from working, and the future value of accumulated human capital. Their e ort choices are private information and ultimately the source of moral hazard. We incorporate career concerns by allowing human capital accumulated on the job to depend on e ort. The other dimensions of human capital are de ned by formal education, plus previously held executive positions and their durations. Thus, each job choice has an investment component. At the beginning of every period, the equity returns of rms from decisions made in the previous period are revealed to everyone, the executives' human capital state variables are updated, and each executive is compensated following the schedule of the previous period's employment contract. Firms assess their demand for executives in the current period and post one-period contracts for positions within their rms. The one-period equilibrium spot contracts are sequentially optimal. The contract aligns executive goals with those of shareholders by making compensation depend on the executive's characteristics: Both the nonpecuniary bene ts and the amelioration of monetary incentives due to career concerns vary with executive characteristics, which change over the lifecycle.
The structural econometric model we estimate is based on two equations that hold in the sequential equilibrium we analyze. The rst equation applies to a manager who is indi erent between accepting any job match and exiting in equilibrium. It equates the systematic portion of the manager's expected utility (the sum of current utility, the certainty equivalent of compensation and the investment value of human capital), conditional on human capital and job-match choice, with the net value of the disturbance from exiting. The net value of the marginal disturbance and the value of human capital can be written as functions of the conditional-choice probabilities.
The second equation is derived from the wage schedule for the optimal contract. We show that, up to a factor of proportionality, the slope of the contract identi es the likelihood ratio of abnormal returns for di erent e ort choices. This fact provides the means for estimating the model's remaining parameters. We also show the extent to which our model is nonparametrically identi ed. We prove an observational equivalence holds between longterm optimal contracts when career concerns are absent and equilibrium spot contracts when career concerns are present. We then show that all the elements of the pay-di erential decomposition are independent of this distinction except one: Career concerns. Thus, the identi cation of the costs and bene ts of shirking does not hinge on whether there are career concerns. Finally, the identi cation of the extent to which career concerns ameliorate the agency problem requires either exclusion restrictions or functional-form assumptions on the evolution of human capital when managers shirk.
The three extensions we undertake to the Roy (1951) model (nonpecuniary utility, agency, and human capital) are motivated by empirical regularities found in our data, a matched sample of over 30,000 executives and 2,500 rms spanning 14 years. The stylized fact that larger rms pay more compensation than smaller rms might be attributable to inferior working conditions in the former. Second, top executives are paid a signi cant portion of their total compensation in stock and options, raising their expected total compensation by a risk premium. Third, our data show that previous executive experience in other rms raises executive compensation at higher ranks in the hierarchy. Forward-looking managers accumulate this form of human capital when choosing between jobs.
Our data also show that the composition of rm-denominated securities varies substantially across ranks and executives at di erent points in their lifecycles: For example executives closer to their retirement position or age receive substantially more incentive pay, increasing total expected compensation through a higher risk premium. This regularity gives additional empirical motivation for including both agency and dynamic considerations. Incorporating a theory of career concerns allows us to account for this empirical regularity and investigate whether it varies with rm size.
We document a sizable rm-size pay premium for executives in both total compensation and incentive pay. The paper shows that this rm-size pay gap is robust to controls for industry, executive rank, human capital, and individual characteristics. Average pay increases as executives are promoted, and executive experience accumulated in di erent rms increases human capital, raising the chance of becoming a CEO, empirical regularities consistent with Fox's (2009) model of hierarchy matching. To assess sources of the rm-size pay premium, we control for sorting and risk aversion by calculating the certainty-equivalent wage by rm size. We control for risk aversion because over two thirds of executive compensation is paid in the form of rm-denominated securities.
Our structural estimates show that the certainty-equivalent wage declines with rm size. To understand why, we further decompose the certainty-equivalent wage into four components: The compensating di erential for the disutility of working, the compensating di erential for human-capital accumulation, the agency risk premium, and the demand for executive talent. The compensating di erential for the disutility from work would explain the rm-size pay gap if larger rms had negative job attributes. However, we nd that the nonpecuniary costs of working are larger in smaller rms. This is the main reason the certainty-equivalent wage is decreasing in rm size. We nd that human-capital accumulation does not decline through the ranks but peaks at the rank just below and at the CEO level, primarily because attaining either position promises a longer future tenure with the rm than the others. Similarly, we nd that to counteract declining career concerns as an executive approaches retirement, explicit incentives increase with age and dead-end positions. In net, the compensating di erential for human-capital accumulation does not vary much with rm size.
How then, do we explain the sizable rm-size pay premium observed in the executive labor market? A risk premium, rationalized in our model by incentive contracts to deter shirking, accounts for approximately 80 percent of the rm-size pay premium. More speci cally, the estimated risk premium is $1.6 million for small rms, $2.6 million for medium-sized rms, and $4.9 million for large rms. Loosely interpreted, these ndings are consistent with explanations that suggest large rms pay large e ciency wages to prevent shirking (Doeringer and Piore,1971; Ra and Summers,1987; Katz and Summers,1989) . They also corroborate ndings in Gayle and Miller (2009b) that the increase in rm size, through its e ect on the moral hazard problem, can explain the growth of CEO compensation over the past 50 years.
Since the average equity value is $322 million for small rms, $1,071 million for medium-size rms and $6,022 million for large rms, the risk premium is concave increasing in rm size. Moreover, we nd that opportunities to invest in human capital do not vary appreciably with rm size, and as noted above, large rms provide more nonpecuniary bene ts than small rms. Consequently, these three factors cannot explain why further amalgamation does not occur. Our estimates attribute the remaining 20 percent of the rm-size pay premium to a higher demand for executives from larger rms that attract and retain executives who would otherwise exit the occupation. These results on the relationship and importance of agency costs to rm size provide some of the rst empirical evidence that con rms the theoretical predictions of Lucas (1978) and Aron (1988) .
We also explore what drives di erentials in the risk premium. The risk premium arises from the agency problem, and its severity depends on three factors. First, the more executives value shirking versus working, the greater the risk premium in the equilibrium contract. We nd the utility from shirking versus working is higher in small rms than in large rms. Therefore, this factor cannot explain the rm-size risk-premium gap. Second, career concerns ameliorate the agency problem and reduce the risk premium because in the extended version of our model, working provides human capital. Empirically, we nd that this does not vary by rm size. Third, the quality of the signal about e ort, which in our model is the likelihood ratio of the density of excess returns from shirking versus working, a ects the cost of moral hazard { that is, the risk premium. We nd that signal quality is unambiguously poorer in larger rms, overwhelming the other two e ects. On re ection, this is not surprising: The hierarchy of ranks varies signi cantly across size, with larger rms having more supervisory positions and accountability more di cult, which leads to greater reliance on incentive pay.
Finally, a coherent interpretation of how management teams function within corporations can be gleaned from the estimated model. We nd that the equity lost from an executive shirking declines with executive rank, contradicting conventional wisdom. Since those lower in the ranks and closer to operations can most a ect excess returns to the rm, a CEO is clearly not paid more because of his power to create or destroy shareholder value. Furthermore, we do not nd support for another traditional view that high-level executives have more discretion than low-level managers to seize opportunities they value at the expense of shareholders. Although the estimated bene ts from shirking modestly increase with rank, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality. The e ects of weaker signals at higher ranks that translate to a higher risk premium explain most of the di erences in total compensation across ranks, a nding broadly consistent with the monitoring paradigm of McNulty (1984) . More generally, highly ranked executives are paid more than lower-ranked executives for largely the same reasons that executives are paid more in large rms than in small rms: They are further from operations and can do less damage to the rm, so the signal they give shareholders is less informative, inducing in equilibrium a more incentivized contract supported by a much bigger risk premium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the data and documents the stylized facts on the rm-size pay gaps in the executive labor market. Section 4 presents the basic model without implicit incentives. Section 5 extends the model to include implicit incentives. Section 6 analyses the identi cation of the model. Section 7 outlines the estimation strategy. Section 8 presents the estimates and the decomposition of the rm-size pay gaps. Section 9 discusses agency costs and rm size. Section 10 concludes. The proofs of all the main results are in the appendix at the end of the paper. More details on the data construction, additional results, and derivations of examples used in the paper are collected in an online appendix.
RELATED LITERATURE
Several papers (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1983; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervi• o, 2008) have used assignment and sorting to model the executive labor market; none combine assignment and sorting with moral hazard and and describing their titles. Each executive worked for one of the 2,818 rms comprising the (composite) S&P 500, MidCap, and SmallCap indices for at least one year spanning the period 1992 to 2006, which covers about 85 percent of the U.S. equities market. In the years for which we have observations, the executive was one of the eight top-paid employees in the rm whose compensation was reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Data on the 2,818 rms for the ExecuComp database were supplemented by the COMPUSTAT North America database and monthly stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices database. We also gathered background history for a subsample of 16,300 executives, recovered by matching the 30,614 executives from our COMPUSTAT database using their full name, year of birth and gender with the records in Marquis Who's Who, which contains biographies of about 350,000 executives. The matched data provide us unprecedented access to detailed rm characteristics, including accounting and nancial data, along with their managers' characteristics { namely, the main components of their compensation, including pension, salary, bonus, option and stock grants plus holdings; their sociodemographic characteristics, including age, gender, and education; and a comprehensive description of their career path sequence described by their annual transitions through the possible positions and rms.
We construct a hierarchy consisting of ve ranks using a rational ordering over a set of job titles based on transition independent of compensation.
2 Rank 1 includes chairman of the board of the company or chairman of a subsidiary who does not have any other executive positions in the rm. Rank 2 is the CEO of the company. Rank 3 includes the COO, the CFO, and the chairman of the board of the company if that person holds an executive position in the company other than CEO. Other high-level corporate executives and heads of subsidiaries or regional chiefs comprise Rank 4, while Rank 5 is reserved for lower-level executives. Thus, CEOs are not in Rank 1. Since this hierarchy is based on transitions, the ranking re ects lifecycle considerations, not power or control. The ranking corroborates the institutional use of the term, which emphasizes the supervisory roles of managers over their subordinates. For example, the chairman of the board of directors monitors the CEO of the rm.
We classify rms into three industrial sectors: primary, consumer, and service. Firms are also partitioned by size { large, medium, and small { based on the value of their assets and number of employees over the sample period. A rm is de ned as large if both its value of assets and its number of employees are above the median for its sector over the sample period, and as small if both its value of assets and number employees are below the median for its sector over the sample. All other rms are medium sized. We further classify rms by the number of \insiders" on their board relative to the industrial norm. A company is de ned as having a large insider board if the number of insiders on its board is above the median for its sector and rm size. Finally, re ecting our focus on executive compensation, rms are classi ed from the perspective of their executives: New if this is the rst year the executive is working in the rm and old if the executive has worked in the rm for more than one year. This variable allows us to capture the e ects of executive turnover. Summarizing, there are 36 rm types, di erentiated by size, industrial sector, importance of insiders on the board, and whether the executive in question has just joined the rm.
Total compensation is the sum of salary and bonus, the value of restricted stocks and options granted, the value of retirement and long-term compensation schemes, plus changes in wealth from executives holding rm options and changes in wealth from holding rm stock relative to a well-diversi ed market portfolio.
3 Hence, the change in wealth from holding their rms' stock is the value of the stock at the beginning of the period multiplied by the abnormal return, de ned as the residual component of returns that cannot be priced by aggregate factors the manager does not control.
Individual characteristics consist of several dimensions of labor market experience, some demographic background variables, and whether the executive is interlocked.
4 Variables we construct on labor market experience include years of tenure with the rm, years worked as top executive, number of rms in which an executive 2 The method for constructing the hierarchy, and a detailed description of the titles in each rank, is in Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2012) .
3 Changes in wealth from holding rm stock and options re ect the cost a manager incurs from not being able to fully diversify her wealth portfolio because of restrictions on stock and option sales. When forming their portfolio of real and nancial assets, managers recognize that part of the return from their rm-denominated securities should be attributed to aggregate factors, so they reduce their holdings of other stocks to neutralize those factors. See Antle and Smith (1985, 1986) , Hall and Liebman (1998) , Margiotta and Miller (2000) , and Gayle and Miller (2009a,b) for other papers using this measure of total executive compensation.
4 An executive is classi ed as interlocked if at least one of the following is true: (i) The executive serves on the board committee that makes her compensation decisions. (ii) The executive serves on the board of another company that has an executive o cer serving on the compensation committee of the indicated executive's company. (iii) The executive serves on the compensation committee of another company that has an executive o cer serving on the board of the indicated executive's company.
worked before becoming an executive, and the number of rms in which an executive worked after becoming an executive. We also observe educational quali cations (including MBA, MSc, PhD), gender, and age. Finally, since the price of console bonds plays a role in consumption smoothing in our model, we construct a bond price series from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). Online Appendix B contains a full description of the construction and a data summary.
Preliminary Analysis of the Data
This section documents the rm-size di erences in compensation, hierarchy, education, experience, and mobility patterns in the executive labor market. Documenting these basic empirical regularities is worthwhile because the previous literature on pay and rm size focused on other labor markets, and investigators studying at the executive labor market (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Gayle and Miller, 2009b) did not have data on hierarchy, education, work experience and mobility. Figure 1A shows that both total compensation and the xed component, salary, increases with rm size. However, total compensation increases signi cantly more than salary. For example, the average total compensation for an executive in a large rm is 2.7 times that of an executive in a small rm, but the average salary for an executive in a large rm is only 1.7 times that of an executive in a small rm. Thus, not only is compensation increasing with rm size, but so too is incentive pay. Figure 1B shows that hierarchy also varies with rm size. For example, large rms are more likely than small rms to separate the jobs of CEO (Rank 2) from chairman of the board (Rank 1). This might suggest that large rms have a more serious monitoring problem than small rms; this hypothesis has been proposed in the literature as a reason for the rm-size pay premium. Also, Rank 5 is more likely in a small rm than a large rm, while the opposite is true for Rank 4. Figure 2A shows that executives in large rms have more formal education than executives in small rms. Among executives with formal education there are also di erences by rm size. While executives with a PhD are equally distributed across rm size, large rms have a higher concentration of executives with an MBA but a lower concentration of nonbusiness master's degrees. This might suggest that large rms have a higher demand for talent. However, Figure 2B gives reason to pause, as both tenure and years of executive experience decrease with rm size. On the other hand, age increases with rm size. Together, Figures 2A and 2B follow Mincer's (1974) arguments about the value of schooling: Executives in large rms have less job experience and are older because they acquired more formal education. Our data are from a truncated sample of upper management executives in publicly held companies, so we cannot infer much about the lengthy incubation phase that characterizes executive selection. However, we can nevertheless infer something about the value of human capital acquired through experience on the job by investigating the movement and decisions through the hierarchy and their subsequent careers conditional on their human capital upon entering management.
Given the interaction among rm size, hierarchy, and human capital, Table 1 presents the main characteristics of our sample by executive rank. Rank 1 has the highest exit rate, while Rank 2 has the lowest exit rate and the highest turnover rate. Average age, tenure, and executive experience increase with rank. Rank 2 executives have the most experience in other rms since becoming an executive but the least experience with other rms before becoming an executive. Those with no college are more likely to ll the upper ranks, while those with a doctorate are most likely to be found in Ranks 4 and 5. Thus, Rank 5 executives are the most educated by every measure except MBA, while a Rank 2 executives are more likely to have an MBA than an executive in any other rank. Salary, total compensation, and the likelihood of being a board member rise with advancing rank, peak at Rank 2, and then decline at Rank 1.
None of the results on compensation and mobility documented in Table 1 and Figure 1A account for interactions between rm size and hierarchy ( Figure 1B ), education (Figure 2A ), and experience ( Figure 1C ). Table  2 shows the e ects of using conditioning information in four regressions: on compensation and three indicators of job mobility. First is a second-order polynomial compensation regression that decomposes compensation in terms of its xed and variable components. The rst three columns of Table 2 report the coe cients and their estimated standard errors from this one regression on rank (panel A), rm type (panel B), and human capital plus individual heterogeneity (panel C). Second is a multivariable logit that summarizes promotion. The third and fourth are logit regressions, that, summarize the probability of changing rms and retirement, respectively. Panel A of Table 2 shows the empirical regularities in the rm-size pay premium are robust to controlling for these interactions. Panel B of Table 2 shows three empirical regularities with regard to compensation and rm type: (i) Larger rms compensate executives with higher xed pay, as is customary in labor markets and, on average, higher incentive pay as well. (ii) Firms with a larger number of insiders on their board of directors have higher incentive pay but the same xed pay. (iii) The service sector pays the highest xed pay and o ers the highest incentive pay, while the primary sector pays the lowest xed pay and o ers the lowest incentive pay. Does (i) imply that certainty-equivalent pay is higher in large rms than small rms? Answering this question requires knowledge of the risk parameter of executives,which we obtained from an identi ed behavioral model that we assume generates the data.
Panel C of Table 2 demonstrates three empirical regularities with regard to compensation and human capital: (i) The e ect of tenure is highly nonlinear and varies by rank. (ii) Tenure in a given rank does not a ect the xed component of pay but does a ect the variable component. (iii) Years of executive experience a ects the variable but not the xed component of executive pay. These empirical regularities demonstrate the signi cance of human capital in determining compensation. The last seven columns of Table 2 show that rm size does not seem to a ect promotion, turnover, or exit, but human capital does.
In summary, with the notable exception that there is less mobility between rms in the primary sector, which could well be due to technological considerations and specialized training, rm size and sector di erences a ect only compensation|not promotion, turnover, or exit|suggesting that a static model of compensating di erentials might account for them. However, exit is convex increasing in age; older executives are more likely to be found in the highest paid ranks and are paid a premium for any rank they hold. In addition, they have substantially more incentive pay. This is more consistent with a nonstationary dynamic model with career concerns in which aging executives become increasingly productive but less willing (and ultimately unable) to remain employed with the rm. Job turnover complicates the picture because newly hired executives at Ranks 2 and 3 receive a substantial sign-on bonus, reinforced by declining compensation with increased tenure. Similarly, newly hired executives at all ranks are not subject to the same performance pay criteria as executives with more tenure. This could be construed as evidence of an orientation phase in which new hires are initially given less responsibility so they can familiarize themselves with their working environment. Consequently, they are not held as accountable for rm performance in their rst year. However, the distribution of ranks and human capital varies by rm size, suggesting that evaluating the determinants of the rm-size pay premium requires a model that simultaneously incorporates all of these factors.
THE BASIC MODEL
The building blocks of the model are moral hazard, sorting, nonpecuniary bene ts from jobs, human capital, and career concerns. These building blocks are parsimoniously combined to facilitate estimation of the underlying technology and utility parameters rationalizing executive compensation in di erent rms, as well as its evolution with age, tenure, and experience. For pedagogical reasons we defer our analysis of career concerns to the next section. In the basic model, shareholders are expected value maximizers subject to moral hazard from choices made by risk-averse executives, who have private information about their own e ort levels. Executives invest in rm-speci c and general human capital through experience on the job. They sequentially choose employment, propose cost-minimizing contracts to shareholders, and then select their e ort levels. This process determines the returns to shareholders and executive compensation. Free entry by rms ensures that executives extract all the rent from their job matches.
Executives and Firms
A nite number of rms in the executive market are indexed by j 2 f1; : : : ; Jg, with j = 0 representing retirement. There are K positions within each rm j, indexed by k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg and ranked in hierarchical order. Di erent combinations of rms and ranks capture heterogeneity of jobs in the economy. Firms belong to di erent industries and have di erent sizes of capital and employment. Thus, the position of a CEO in a large rm in the manufacturing industry, for example, may be di erent from a CEO position in a small rm in the service industry in terms of the tasks performed, skill requirements, and nonpecuniary bene ts and costs. Let t 2 f0; 1; : : :g denote each executive's age, with retirement upon reaching or before age T < 1. To simplify the notation, we assume that executives are in nitely lived. Each executive's background is de ned by age t and a vector of human capital, h t , which includes xed demographic characteristics and indexes work experience.
Choices
At the beginning of period t, which denotes age, an executive chooses her consumption, c t , and, for any t T , makes her employment choices. She proposes an employment contract and after securing the agreement of shareholders, signs the contract that determines her compensation. She then chooses her e ort, which is unobserved by the shareholders. Let d jkt 2 f0; 1g indicate the executive's choice of rank k in rm j at age t, and let d 0t denote the indicator variable for retirement. The JK + 1 choices are mutually exclusive, implying There are two e ort levels { working diligently and shirking { denoted by l t 2 f0; 1g, where l t = 0 indicates the executive shirks at age t and l t = 1 indicates the executive works. E ort a ects the distribution of the rm's returns and the executive's current-period nonpecuniary utility. As in standard moral hazard models, the goals of executives and shareholders are not aligned. Therefore, the term shirk refers to activities that bene t the executive but not shareholders, and working describes e ort and activities undertaken to achieve shareholder goals.
Preferences
The executive's preferences depend on her consumption and nonpecuniary utility associated with labor supply choices. Preferences are characterized by the discounted sum of a time-additive separable, constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function. The utility function is decomposed into utility from consumption and a nonpecuniary cost of working. The nonpecuniary costs of working and shirking are allowed to be di erent in each rank and rm, and are further decomposed into systematic and nonsystematic components. The nonsystematic component captures the executive's rm-and rank-speci c idiosyncratic taste shock, which does not depend on e ort. The taste shock vector in period t is denoted by " t (" 0t ; " 11t ; : : : ; " JKt ), where " 0t is the shock from choosing retirement and the taste shock from working in rm j at rank k is " jkt . The systematic component of the nonpecuniary utility from working depends on the executive's e ort, characteristics and experience h t , as well as the rm and rank. When the executive works (setting l t = 1), her nonpecuniary utility is jkt (h t ); when she shirks, it is jkt (h t ). The executive's lifetime utility can thus be summarized as
where denotes the subjective discount factor and is the constant absolute risk-aversion parameter. The systematic component of nonpecuniary bene ts from retiring is normalized to 1. We assume there is more disutility from working than from shirking, so jkt (h) > jkt (h). The di erence between jkt (h t ) and jkt (h t ) captures the divergence between the shareholder and executive goals. This formulation of the utility function captures di erences in nonpecuniary costs across ranks and rms. It accounts for di erent levels of moral hazard between large and small rms and among ranks and industries. The formulation also allows executives with di erent characteristics to have di erent disutilities from rm, rank, and e ort choices. CARA utility is commonly assumed in analyses involving dynamics and uncertainty because of its tractability. Under CARA the log of indirect utility is linear in outside wealth and additively separable in taste shocks and shifters. Consequently, outside wealth is eliminated when comparing di erent options. This is a particularly attractive feature in applications of executive compensation, where data sets rarely, if ever, include detailed information on outside wealth.
Human Capital
Human capital is multidimensional and includes skills that depend on education and work experience. We de ne a vector of time-invariant characteristics and skills, h 1 , that captures gender and education dummies. We further de ne a vector to capture the individual's history of rank-rm choices, including retirement, as h 2t = (h 211t ; : : : ; h 2JKt ). Thus, the vector that captures all human capital is h t = (h 1 ; h 2t ). We also de ne a transition function, H jk (h 2t ), to capture the evolution of human capital; we assume the function is deterministic and that human capital follows the law of motion:
Our speci cation of human capital accumulation, captured by h 2t , encompasses two dimensions. First, the model captures information about where ( rm and rank) human capital is acquired; therefore, it contains information about industry and rm size. Second, the speci cation captures the applicability of the human capital. That is, it (i) captures by how much experience in the j th rm at rank k increases productivity in each rm and rank and (ii) allows for increments to di er by rm and rank. Example. To illustrate the process of human-capital accumulation and help motivate the empirical application that follows, in this example we de ne an executive-rm match by a coordinate pair (j 1 ; j 2 ) and a triplet h 2t h
2t ; h
2t . Thus, j 1 2 f0; 1g is an indicator of whether the rm is new to the executive or not, where j 1 = 1 indicates the executive worked for this rm last period, and j 1 = 0 indicates she did not; j 2 2 f1; 2; : : : ; J 2 g are indicators of the rm's size and industrial sector. With regards to h 2t , let h 2t the number of di erent rms in which the executive has worked since becoming an executive. The transition function for human capital is speci ed as
where jk
jk ;
jk . If the executive does not retire but chooses a new rm, then jk = h
2t ; 1; 1 . This means she would lose all her rm-speci c capital, gain an additional year of executive experience, and increase the number of rms in which she worked. On the other hand, if she remains with her current rm, then jk = (1; 1; 0). While h 2t is more novel, capturing the idea that managers may acquire skills from working in di erent organizations. It allows for the possibility that younger executives might change rms more often than otherwise to gain this dimension of human capital and increase the chance of advancing to a high rank in the future. This element is similar to the experimentation literature on human capital (Miller, 1984; Antonovics and Golan, 2012; Sanders, 2013) except in that body of work learning about unknown skills takes place, whereas in this framework the upper levels of the managerial hierarchy value certain types of experience that can most e ciently be acquired by working in multiple rms.
Firm Technology
Firm production and value. In this subsection alone, it is necessary to identify the executive pool explicitly because rms may employ more than one executive in the same position. To distinguish between lifecycle e ects and aggregate technological shocks, we also track workers' ages over calendar time. We now suppose there are N j executives who sort themselves into positions at the j th rm in period . Denote by t ( ; n) the age of the nth executive at calendar time and her human capital at by h t( ;n) . Let F jk (h t( ;n) ) denote the executive's contribution to the j th rm's output in if she chooses the k th job with that rm by setting d jkt( ;n) = 1. Let +1 denote a return from an exogenous aggregate productivity shock that a ects every rm, and let j; +1 denote the (net) excess return to the j th rm. Let E j denote the value of rm j at the beginning of calendar time . Finally, denote by w (n) jk +1 the rm's compensation to executive n if she worked at rank k in period . We assume the production of rm j at is then de ned as the sum of three components: ;n) ) is the contribution to output from all the rm's executives. (ii) E j +1 is the return on equity attributable to aggregate productivity shocks. (iii) E j j; +1 is the excess return to the rm, j; +1 , whose probability distribution depends on the e ort of all the executives. The rst component of the output, the summed expression involving F jk (h t( ;n) ); is additively separable in the productivity of each executive n. It depends on the characteristics of executives in the rm, but not on their e orts, and captures each executive's contribution to the rm, which depends on her human capital, h t( ;n) . This individual factor is deterministic, has a level e ect on the executive's marginal product, and is independent of the individual's e ort and other executives' characteristics and e orts. The second component, +1 , captures the e ect of aggregate factors on the rm's equity.
5 In standard moral hazard models, the optimal contract does not depend on the market portfolio or aggregate factors the executive cannot a ect, because they are risk averse and a contract depending on such factors imposes additional risk on them without providing any additional incentive. Assuming all dividends are paid when the rm is liquidated, the equity of the rm evolves according to the law of motion
We show that in equilibrium the expected compensation to an executive fully o sets his expected contribution to output. Setting the summed expression to zero and rearranging Equation (4.5) to make j; +1 the subject then yields the standard de nition of excess returns in the asset-pricing literature, E j; +1 =E j +1 . Distribution of abnormal returns. Executive e ort a ects the rm only through the probability distribution determining j; +1 . We analyze an equilibrium where every executive works, in which case the value of j; +1 is drawn from a probability density function denoted by f j ( ). Consistent with standard asset-pricing theory, we normalize the expected value of abnormal returns in equilibrium from everyone working to zero.
If everyone except the k th ranked executive works, conditional on any level of human capital h t , the value of j; +1 is on f j ( )g jk ( jh t ). Thus, the impact on production from an executive shirking is captured by g jk ( jh t ), the likelihood ratio for the density when the executive with h t in position k shirks while all other executives work, and the density when all executives work diligently. Since equilibrium compensation depends on j; +1 , the k th-ranked executive realizes that if he was the only one to shirk, his expected compensation would depend on f j ( )g jk ( jh t ), and this consideration ultimately explains why f j ( )g jk ( jh t ) helps shape equilibrium compensation.
Let f 0j ( ) denote the probability density function for when the combination of who works and who shirks is chosen to maximize its expected value subject to the constraint that at least two executives shirk. The precise functional form of f 0j ( ) is immaterial in an equilibrium where everyone works, because f 0j ( ) generates only if two or more executives deviate from their equilibrium action.
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In our model, a necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist where everyone works is that expected abnormal returns are maximized by everyone working. Formally, we assume
The potential for con ict between executive and shareholder goals arises in this model from the preferences of executives to shirk rather than work; that is, jkt (h t ) > jkt (h t ), whereas the inequalities in (4.6) show production is greater when all executives work. The span of control. The likelihood ratio g jk ( jh t ) measures the degree to which executive e ort can a ect a rm's returns, so we interpret it as a measure of their span of control. Since g jk ( jh t ) depends on rank within the rm, there is scope for testing whether this measure of the span of control declines with rank, a hypothesis advanced by Williamson (1967) .
8 Similarly, g jk ( jh t ) depends on rm size, so we can test whether the span of control increases with rm size and, in conjunction with the other estimated parameters, calculate whether agency costs increase in rm size, a rationale Lucas (1978) postulated for diminishing returns to scale in rm size. Note that g jk ( jh t ) depends on both rm and executive characteristics, but not on the number of executives in a rm, nor their human capital. Relaxing this assumption would endogenize the optimal number of executives in each rm { and the con guration of human capital within the management team { a challenge for future research.
E ort is unobserved in our model, but j; +1 is a signal of e ort. In this respect, g jk ( jh t ) measures the quality of the signal. For example, if g jk ( 0 ; h) = 1 for some 0 , then the signal is uninformative about e ort. If there existed some 00 in the support of f j ( ) such that g jk ( 00 ; h) was arbitrarily large, then the signal would be so informative that a rst-best allocation could be achieved by heavily penalizing all executives if 00 occurs, and paying a constant wage otherwise. Since executives are not paid constant wages, we assume g jk ( jh t ) is bounded. We also impose the regularity condition
Intuitively, this condition states that if rm performance at the end of the period is truly outstanding, then shareholders are almost certain that all the executives have worked during the period. Our assumptions ensure the existence of an optimal contract with bounded compensation (Mirrlees, 1975) and are clearly weaker than the common monotonicity assumption requiring g jk ( jh t ) to decline in .
4.6. Capital Markets, Information, and Timing
Capital markets. Following Margiotta and Miller (2000), we assume that executives have su cient access to nancial markets to smooth their outside wealth without using their rm as a bank. In our model, this means there exists a complete contingent-claims market for consumption, including all publicly disclosed events relating to commodities with price measure and derivative at date . Thus, for each 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g, the term is the price at time 0 of contingent claims to consumption delivered at date . For example, E[ ], is the number of consumption units forgone in date 0 to obtain a sure-consumption unit in date and fE[ ]g 1 1 is the -period interest rate. We measure w jkt( )+1 , the executive's compensation for employment in position k at rm type j at the beginning of age t + 1, in units of current consumption. Since the executive's wealth is endogenously determined by her compensation, it cannot be fully insured if it depends on the rm's returns j; +1 . Naturally, value-maximizing banks would not voluntarily insure executives against volatile excess returns in their own rm, because the executive might then nd it optimal to shirk, generating expected losses to the bank. Public disclosure laws require top executives to declare their nancial holdings in securities issued by their own rm, so given our technology, it is easy for banks to protect themselves against this form of insider trading.
Information. Each executive is privy to her taste shocks, e ort level, and outside wealth. Similarly, consumption choices by executives are not public. All other information is symmetric. Everyone observes human capital, executive rank, and rm choices of all executives plus their compensation for the previous period's employment. Although F jk (h t ) cannot be separately observed, it is also public knowledge. Thus, at the beginning of each calendar period , the market observes h t( ;n) ; d t( ;n) and
jk for all N executives, plus the aggregate return , and the initial equity E j and excess returns j of all J rms, while every executive also observes her own outside wealth (n) , her idiosyncratic taste shocks " (n) , and in addition recalls her own e ort history fl Timeline. At the beginning of each period, executives are compensated according to their contracts. After observing her own taste shock vector, each executive privately chooses her consumption and makes her asset portfolio choice. She simultaneously decides whether to retire or not; and if she decides not to retire, she decides which rm to be employed in and at what rank and e ort level. She approaches the rm and makes an ultimatum o er that the shareholders can only accept or reject. If the o er is rejected, the executive retires and there is no additional hiring by the rm.
Intertemporal Consumption and Employment Choices
As a step towards deriving the optimal contract we rst derive the value function for an executive who is constrained to work each period she is employed. The separability of preferences, the constant absolute riskaversion assumption, and the existence of complete markets for consumption goods implies the value function for the executive's dynamic optimization problem multiplicatively factors into two pieces, an indirect utility function for wealth and an index that represents the value of human capital.
Valuing human capital. The value of human capital depends on how much it will be used and how much to discount the future. Accordingly, let b denote the price of a bond that, contingent on the history through date , pays a unit of consumption from period in perpetuity in calendar period-prices
We assume throughout that executives can accurately forecast bond prices, but not necessarily other aggregate prices, let alone individual returns on stocks. Let p jkt (h) denote the probability of choosing (j; k) at age t conditional on h, and similarly, denote by p 0t (h) the retirement probability. 9 Also let " jkt denote the value of " jkt conditional on choosing (j; k) at t. Thus, " jkt = " jkt if d jkt = 1 and is not de ned if d jkt = 0. We de ne an index of human capital for a t-year-old executive with characteristics h who works as
where jk;t+1 is a util measure of compensation from working, annuitized for consumption smoothing purposes, de ned as
The index A t (h) is an average of expected outcomes weighted by the conditional-choice probabilities from making di erent (j; k) choices, including retirement. By inspection, the index is strictly positive, and lower values of A t (h) are associated with higher values of human capital. Increasing expected compensation reduces E t [ jk;t+1 ] and A t (h). Similarly, A t (h) is monotonically increasing in jkt (h), the utility-weighted nonpecuniary losses of job characteristics.
Example. Equation (4.9) shows that in general, all future probabilities are used to weight the career paths that might be taken. However, the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption dramatically simpli es the formula for A t (h); allowing us to focus on the probability of retirement alone. For example, suppose " t is type I extreme value, and let ( ) denote the complete gamma function. We prove in the supplementary appendix that
Thus, at the beginning of period t, before observing the vector of disturbances " t but conditioning on all the state variables plus the bond price, the higher the probability of retirement, the lower the value of human capital. Ex ante value function. The consumer choice problem is standard, and it is simpli ed by the fact that very few securities are required to characterize the optimal nancial portfolio for CARA utility functions.
10 In particular, let a denote the price of a security that pays the random quantity (ln s s ln ) of consumption from period in perpetuity in period-prices:
Lemma 4.1 shows it is a function of the security's price a , the bond price b , wealth denoted by t ; and human capital h as it a ects the index A t (h; b ):
Lemma 4.1 Let U t (h t ; t ; a ; b ) denote the maximized discounted sum of expected utility from age t < R onward given (h t ; t ; a ; b ). In other words, U t (h t ; t ; a ; b ) is the value function for a t-year-old executive with characteristics h t and wealth t ; who has not yet observed " t ; and will make optimal consumption and jobmatch choices thereafter, subject to the constraint of working every period before retirement, when the nancial securities are priced at (a ; b ). Then,
The term b exp [ (a + t ) /b ] is the value function for a retiree. Thus, equation (4.13) shows that the optimized lifetime expected utility is the product of utility from nancial wealth and human capital. This simpli es the maximization problem faced by executives: They can use the indirect utility from Lemma 4.1 in the lifetime utility function, equation (4.2), to solve for their employment choices.
Theorem 4.2 If t R and l s = 1 for all s 2 ft; : : : ; Rg, then job choices d t are picked to maximize
This formulation generalizes Roy's (1951) model to a dynamic framework that encompasses several models of labor market sorting. Motivated by pecuniary and nonpecuniary bene ts, plus human-capital considerations, executives sort themselves into jobs within the same rm and across di erent rms. Compensation for current work is given as jk;t+1 , and similar to hedonic price models with compensating di erentials, the nonpecuniary bene ts from the job are given by jkt (h) and " jkt . The dynamics are based on H jk (h), the e ect of taking (j; k) on current human capital h that is valued by A t+1 [H jk (h); b +1 ], an index of human capital that accounts for the pecuniary and nonpecuniary bene ts (and thus expected) that comes from making optimal choices about future jobs and ranks. It provides a framework for analyzing the trade-o between the di erent types of attractions that alternative careers, which might o er di erent starting conditions, earnings growth, measured in terms of both pecuniary and nonpecuniary bene ts that accrue over the executive's career.
Lifecycle job choices in equilibrium. Next, we characterize the rm and rank choice probabilities and how they change over the lifecycle in an equilibrium in which all executives work diligently. Empirically, these choice probabilities map into the model's parameters and, therefore, play an important role in estimation. The vector of choice probability functions, p t (h) (p 11t (h); : : : ; p JKt (h)), that the executive uses to compute A t (h) in equation (4.9) are precisely the probability functions that characterize her choices when solving the optimization function described by (4.14). We appeal to Proposition 1 of Hotz and Miller (1993) 
Given h, the solution to the optimization problem in equation (4.14) depends only on the vector of di erences (" 11t " 0t ; : : : ; " JKt " 0t ) rather than their levels, " t . This becomes apparent from substituting out
, collecting terms involving d jkt , and noting that the additive constant, " 0t , has no e ect on the optimal choices. Substituting equation (4.15) into (4.14), we see that if position (j; k) is the optimal employment choice, then " jkt " 0t > q jk [p t (h)] and (j; k) = arg max
(4.16) Given (t; h), the executive is indi erent between all positions if " t satis es the following condition:
It now follows that (" 0t ; q 11t + " 0t ; : : : ; q JKt + " 0t ) de nes, for all " 0t , the set of idiosyncratic shocks, " t , for an executive who would marginally accept any of the JK positions or retire. Example. Inserting equation (4.4) into the A t+1 H jk (h) function implied by (4.11), and noting that q jk [p t (h)] is the familiar log-odds ratio when " t is type I extreme value, (4.15) specializes to a log-linear equilibrium sorting function in the log-odds ratio between any two job match options, including retirement. For example, if j and j 0 have the same rank, we obtain
(4.18) Equation (4.18) highlights the trade-o between the four dimensions: nonpecuniary bene t, jkt (h); human capital accumulation, jk ; expected utility from compensation, E t [ jk;t+1 ]; and implicitly, the privately observed idiosyncratic component to nonpecuniary utility, " t . Consider the three scenarios below.
. A higher value of jkt (h) relative to j 0 kt (h) decreases the probability of choosing rm j relative to rm j 0 . On the other hand, a higher w jk;t+1 (h t ; ) relative to w j 0 k;t+1 (h t ; ) lowers E t [ jk;t+1 ] relative to E t [ j 0 k;t+1 ], and this increases the probability of choosing rm j relative to rm j 0 . This scenario highlights the trade-o between nonpecuniary and pecuniary bene ts embedded in the model.
(ii) Now say w jk;t+1 (h t ; ) = w j 0 k;t+1 (h t ; ), but jkt (h) > j 0 kt (h); and j 0 k 6 = jk : From (4.11) j has a lower investment value than j 0 if and only if p 0;t+1 (h + jk ) > p 0;t+1 (h + j 0 k ). In that case, the additional nonpecuniary disutility from choosing j over j 0 is accentuated by its lower investment value, implying the choice probability for choosing j is lower than for j 0 : (iii) If j dominates j 0 on nonpecuniary bene ts, jkt (h) < j 0 kt (h); compensation, w jk;t+1 (h t ; ) > w j 0 k;t+1 (h t ; ); and investment value, p 0;t+1 (h + jk ) < p 0;t+1 (h + j 0 k ); then from (4.18) j is clearly more likely to be chosen:
Nevertheless, p j 0 kt (h) > 0, because of the fourth factor " t . A fraction of executives drawing a su ciently high " j 0 kt " jkt di erential choose j 0 over j; notwithstanding its lower investment value, poorer compensation, and lower publicly observed systematic nonpecuniary bene ts.
Cost-Minimizing Contracts
Equilibrium contracts that stimulate executives to work minimize the expected cost of attaining the equilibrium conditional-choice probabilities subject to an incentive compatibility condition deterring shirking. Proving this assertion is by simple contradiction argument: Rather than demand an ine cient contract, the executive could have extracted more rent by o ering an e cient contract that made the rm just as pro table. In our model, the cost-minimizing contract is the sum of a xed component, called certainty-equivalent pay, plus a variable component, whose expectation is the risk premium. We derive the certainty equivalent and the incentive compatibility constraint that gives rise to the variable component before presenting a theorem that establishes the cost-minimizing contract.
Certainty-equivalent pay. Equation (4.14) shows that given her e ort choice, the executive is indi erent between all compensation plans with the same value of ln E t [v jk;t+1 jh ]: It immediately follows from (4.10) and (4.14) that certainty-equivalent pay, denoted by w A jk;t+1 (h), is the xed amount solving
Substituting w A jk;t+1 (h)=b +1 for ln E t [v jk;t+1 jh] in Equation (4.15) yields an expression for certainty-equivalent pay in terms of the equilibrium choice probabilities p t (h) over rank and rm (j; k), the nonpecuniary bene ts of the positions of each, jkt (h); along with their investment values A t+1 H jk (h) :
Example. In the specialization, equation (4.19) reduces to
(4.20)
The example illustrates the three channels through which di erentials in mean compensation arise for an executive with a given set of characteristics h. First, jobs di er in jkt (h); the imputed nonpecuniary cost of working. Second they di er in p 0;t+1 (h + jk ); the value of human capital provided by experience. The lower the probability of retirement, the greater the future opportunities for extracting rent in the executive market, and hence the lower the certainty-equivalent wage. Third, jobs have di erent risk premiums, as determined by the likelihood ratio and the relative disutility of working versus shirking. Incentive compatibility. If e ort could be freely monitored and demand existed for executives giving e ort, it follows from equations (4.10) and (4.15) that a cohort of executives aged t and all with human capital h; confronted with job opportunities across K ranks in J rms o ering w A jk;t+1 (h); would sort into the jobs following the probability distribution p t (h). However, shirking by just one executive is disguised because every rm outcome that might occur when one executive shirks could also occur when every executive works; technically, the likelihood ratio, g jk ( jh), is bounded. In equilibrium, every job history has strictly positive mass even though no shirking occurs along the equilibrium path. Underlying this result is our assumption that " jkt has full support and is privately known to only the executive. To construct and verify an equilibrium in which everybody works, it su ces to consider what happens when just one executive deviates from the equilibrium by shirking and all the others work.
Shareholders would reject a contract that does not give the executive o ering it su cient incentive to work. Thus, the contract must yield higher expected utility to the executive from working rather than shirking. In the basic model, shirking does not a ect the state variables' deterministic e ect on the next period's human capital, but it does give the executive another combination of nonpecuniary and nancial packages from which to choose. With reference to (4.14), the incentive compatibility constraint for the basic model is thus
Optimization. The goal of the executive is to minimize the risk premium, deadweight loss from the perspective of both shareholders and the executive, subject to satisfying (4.21). To solve for the optimal contract, we de ne
where
It is evident from (4.22) that a greater g jk ( jh), which implies that the outcome is relatively more likely to occur when there is shirking, leads to a lower r A jk;t+1 (h; ). Contracting to pay less in states that are relatively more likely to occur when there is shirking encourages the executive to work. Since g jk ( jh ) ! 0 as ! 1, it follows that r A jk;t+1 (h; ) has a nite upper bound of
The higher the rm's returns, the less likely they could have been generated by shirking, and hence the lower the slope of the variable component to compensation. Theorem 4.3 states that the optimal contract is the sum of certainty-equivalent pay de ned by (4.19) and the variable component de ned by (4.22).
Theorem 4.3 The cost-minimizing one-period contract that attracts a executive of age t with experience h to select the kth position in the jth rm with probability p t (h) and work is
The optimal long-term contract can be implemented by a sequence of the one-period contracts de ned in (4.25). Intuitively, if the rm is not serving a banking function for wealth the executive has already accumulated, and if the rm does not receive any further information about a shirking deviation after the period in which it occurs, then any punishment the rm might wish to administer for poor performance can be administered immediately. 
Equilibrium
We complete the characterization of equilibrium with a market clearing condition. The executive supply, the choice probabilities of the di erent rank-rm combinations and retirement, is characterized by equation (4.15) relating the compensation (E t [ jk;t+1 jh]) and the choice probabilities. Theorem 4.3 characterizes the costminimizing contract that satis es the market-participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility constraint. The market-participation constraint relates the certainty-equivalent pay required to attract any type of executive with characteristics h at a certain probability for each job. In equilibrium, the perceived probability of attracting an executive is the choice probability derived from the executive's utility-maximization problem; the marketparticipation constraint derives from the supply equation ensuring this condition. Additionally, the incentivecompatibility constraint is satis ed, so the executive works diligently. To close the model, we pin down the demand for executives by assuming rms have free entry into the executive market, implying zero expected pro t in equilibrium from hiring an executive:
(4.26)
The market-clearing condition, equation (4.26), states that each executive earns her expected marginal productivity in each period, conditional on accepting a contract in which the executive works. The rm makes zero expected pro t, as the expected return on the net equity value is zero, conditional on all executives working. Since the contract is incentive compatible, all executives work. Solving backward to the negotiation stage, given that all other executives work, the executive extracts all the rents conditional on working. An executive cannot extract additional rents resulting from the distortion she causes by shirking instead of working because threatening to shirk is not credible, given the incentive-compatibility constraint. Therefore, the rm rejects any o er higher than the expected productivity, because the value from not lling the position is zero.
As in Rosen (1974) , the market-clearing condition is achieved without frictions in hiring or nding jobs. There is no scarcity of positions, no costs associated with a vacant position, and output is additively separable across executives. Equilibrium compensation is increasing in the nonpecuniary costs and risk; it also depends on the dynamic component, the continuation value of human capital. It adjusts to attract the marginal executive with a taste shock that makes her indi erent between choosing the job and retirement, the assumption that rent sharing determines both the retirement probability and the demand threshold. Thus, equilibrium compensation determines the fraction of executives for every h assigned to each position (j; k). Ex post, a single rm may hire zero, one, or more executives at a given rank, optimal in our model because aside from compensation, no additional hiring costs are incurred when more than one executive accepts a given position.
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The value of accepting a job is rm speci c because (i) there are rm-speci c skills and (ii) executives have independently distributed taste shocks that are private information. Thus, in equilibrium, there is a surplus above the market outside option. In competitive models with match-speci c surplus, rms make zero expected pro t at the time of hiring, and the rst-period wage adjusts to include the expected future pro ts rms make. (See Becker, 1964; Harris and Holmstr• om, 1982; Thomas and Worrall, 1988; Felli and Harris, 1996 .) Here executives earn their expected marginal product every period, so rms make zero expected pro t from hiring an executive in each period. Our approach to job matches is similar to that of Jovanovic (1979) and Miller (1984) . Equation (4.26) is part of an equilibrium outcome for a noncooperative game developed in the next section that generalizes the basic model developed here. In the extension, we assume executives can make ultimatum o ers, and this assumption leads rms to make zero expected pro ts in the sequential equilibrium we analyze. Other mechanisms of surplus sharing in which the executives and shareholders share the surplus may be more realistic. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) show that labor market competition allows skilled workers to extract more surplus than unskilled workers. Our data samples the very top level of the U.S. executive market, where talent is scarce. It is reasonable to presume these executives extract more rents than workers in lower echelons. Our modeling choice of the ultimatum game simpli es the empirical implementation. But in contrast to previous work estimating di erent rent-sharing mechanisms, we model internal promotions and ranks, di erentiating between employers and jobs, and we characterize assignment within rms. Allowing for heterogeneity in executive bargaining power leads to questions about the optimal size of management and the equilibrium con guration of employment (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996a,b) , important issues left for future research.
Example. To recursively compute the equilibrium for the example, we specialize (4.14) by substituting equation (4.11) for A t+1 H jk (h) and equation (4.4) for H jk (h): From (4.25) and (4.26), certainty-equivalent pay is given by
, where the formula for r A jk;t+1 (h; ) is given by (4.22). The value of each job choice in (4.14) can now be expressed as the sum of the disturbance " jkt and a deterministic component
12 In the data, we observe similar rms employing di erent numbers of managers in a given rank.
Since the distribution of " t is type I extreme value, the equilibrium choice probabilities exhibit the usual logit form: (iv) for T 3; : : : t.
EXTENDED MODEL
This section extends the basic model to account for career concerns within a signalling game that has a pure strategy sequential equilibrium which we analyze. In the basic model, the evolution of human capital depends on successive job matches but not on hidden e ort; in this extension, it depends on both. Human capital in the extension is private information, unobserved by shareholders.
13 Thus current hidden e ort choices a ect future unobserved productivity, giving rise to implicit incentives to work for career concerns about future employment choices, promotions, and pay.
14 Because the extension nests the basic model, much of the notation developed in the previous section is common to both.
Human Capital Accumulation and E ort
As previously, human capital is multidimensional, and the dichotomy between h 1 and h 2t remains the same as in the basic model. We assume that if an executive belonging to the j th rm in rank k works, her human capital follows the same transition function as in the basic model, H jk (h 2t ). If she shirks, however, her human capital evolves according to another transition function, H jk (h 2t ). Therefore, the law of motion of human capital becomes 
jk . We assume if the executive shirks, she does not gain an additional year of experience, cannot increase the number of rms for which she has worked by changing jobs, and does not add to her speci c capital if she remains with her current rm. As before, she loses all her speci c capital if she begins working for a new rm whether she works or shirks. Symbolically, 13 Suppose, on the contrary, that investment in human capital is observed by shareholders and is a mapping of e ort. Then the moral hazard problem disappears, and compensation could be based on investment in human capital. Consequently, executives are paid a constant wage as a function of h.
14 Other ways to introduce career concerns into the basic model include having symmetric learning about executive productivity, or allowing for di erential utility bene ts from shirking across executives that is private information. Our formulation captures career concerns in an economically meaningful way while preserving empirical tractability.
Firm Technology and E ort
Firm production technology is the same in both models. However, in the extension, past e ort a ects current human capital h. Hence, individual marginal product, F jk (h); and the likelihood ratio g jk ( jh ) ; are partly determined by h through past e ort, which is unobserved. To simplify the notation and the equilibrium characterization, we make a further assumption that if l 1 = 0, then F jk (h t ) F for all h t .
15 This initial condition places an upper bound on output, ensuring that rms do not bene t from employing executives who shirked in their rst period.
Capital Markets, Timing, and Information
Both models have the same nancial markets for contingent consumption and the same timing assumptions. However, the information structure of the extension is more complicated, because human capital, determined by hidden e ort, is now private information to the executive. Let h 0 t = (h 0 1 ; h 0 2t ) denote shareholder beliefs about an executive's human capital { in short, her reputation { which is distinct from her actual human capital, h t = (h 1 ; h 2t ). The contract is based on her reputation h 0 t , not actual human capital h t . However, if she shirks actual human capital h t counts, and rm returns are drawn from g jk (
We assume shirking by just one executive is disguised; that is, the support of excess rm returns does not depend on the level of human capital, nor on whether every executive works. Similarly, rms cannot de nitively recognize past shirking because individual productivity, F jk (h t ), is not observed separately from the executive team's aggregate output. Since F jk (h t ) cannot be separately observed and human capital is the executive's private information, F jk (h t ) is private information.
Nor can an executive who shirks later be identi ed from her subsequent job choices. In equilibrium, every job history has a strictly positive mass even if no shirking occurs along the equilibrium path. Underlying this result is the assumption that " jkt has full support and is private information. Consequently, shareholders believe that h 0 t follows the law of motion h 0 t+1 = H jk (h 0 t ) when all contracts require working in equilibrium. In truth, if an executive deviates and shirks at age t, her next-period human capital is h t+1 = H jk (h t ). Finally, to simplify the analysis of histories o the equilibrium path, we assume that all rms observe all accepted and rejected contracts, and the full employment histories, of all executives.
Employment and E ort Choices
The intertemporal consumption choices of an executive remain unchanged from the basic model, but the conditions describing her employment must be embellished. In order to characterize the executive's optimal labor supply and e ort choices on and o the equilibrium path, we formulate the value of job matches to the executive when h 0 t 6 = h t . In the model extension, the executive's choice probabilities over positions are denoted by p jkt (h; h 0 ) because they depend on both her true human capital and her reputation. Compensation, however, is based on reputation alone, so in place of jk;t+1 , the risk-adjusted utility from compensation is now de ned as
Analogous to the de nition of A t (h) given in (4.9), we de ne the recursion as
The di erence between A t (h) and B t (h; h 0 ) stems from the minimization used to de ne V jkt (h; h 0 ; b ), the conditional valuation function of match (j; k) for an executive with demographics (t; h) and reputation h 0 . The rst element of the minimization operator in equation (5.5) is the executive's valuation function, net of lifetime utility conferred by endowment wealth, at age t in position (j; k) with human capital h and reputation h 0 from choosing to work. If, in contradiction to our assumptions about private information the executive is monitored, and is always prevented from shirking, then h reduces to h 0 and B t (h; h 0 ) simpli es to A t (h). The second element on the right-hand side of (5.5) is a valuation function for a similarly placed executive who shirks. She reaps the immediate bene t from shirking since jkt (h) < jkt (h), but rm returns are drawn from g jk ( jh) f ( ) rather than f j ( ), a ecting the probability distribution of her compensation, and her reputation subsequently diverges further from her true human capital.
Theorem 5.1 extends the job match problem from equation (4.14) to include the choice of e ort.
H jk (h 0 t ), then job matches d t and e ort levels l t are picked to maximize
Example. Denote the choice probability of retirement for an executive with demographics (t; h) and reputation h 0 by p 0t (h; h 0 ). If " jkt is independent and identically distributed as a type I extreme value with location and scale parameters (0; 1), then it is well known that
Moreover, we show in the supplementary appendix that B t (h; h 0 ) simpli es to
Comparing equation (5.7) with equation (4.18), the only di erence between B t (h; h 0 ) and A t (h), is that B t (h; h 0 ) depends on p 0t (h; h 0 ) rather than p 0t (h); re ecting the role of reputation in the extension.
The Optimal Contract
In the sequential equilibrium we analyze, executives always work along the equilibrium path, in which case h = h 0 . After an executive has strayed o the equilibrium path by shirking, then h 6 = h 0 . We show that in equilibrium, shareholders punish executives who confess to shirking by rejecting all contracts that cannot occur on the equilibrium path. Therefore, the equilibrium response of an executive with true capital h that does not measure up to her reputation h 0 , is to pretend her true human capital is h 0 , by demanding an equilibrium contract as if she had not shirked. Only optimal contracts occurring on the equilibrium path are left to be derived.
The incentive compatibility constraint for inducing work is impounded within the de nition of V jkt (h; h 0 ; b ) given in equation (5.5). When h = h 0 ; the executive works if the compensation schedule satis es 
This inequality shows that when the investment value of human capital is large enough relative to the disutility from working versus shirking, the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind, obviating the need to tie remuneration to the rm's abnormal returns and pay a risk premium.
Second, when compensation is variable because (5.9) fails to hold, Theorem 5.2 shows the cost-minimizing compensation schedule decomposes into a xed and a variable component (analogous to Theorem 4.3 for the basic model), but now the latter is de ned by
where B (h) is the unique positive root in to
, we see from (5.10) and (5.11) that career concerns, captured in the ratio of human capital values, directly o set misaligned incentives stemming from the inequality that jkt (h) < jkt (h); thus reducing the risk premium. Both factors provide implicit incentives that substitute explicit incentives provided by incentive contracts. Since implicit incentives are larger when executives are young, explicit incentives increase as executives get closer to retirement age. . If h 0 = h, then the cost minimizing, one-period contract attracting an executive of age t with experience h to select the kth position in the jth rm with probability p t (h; h) and work l t = 1 is 
(5.14)
In contrast to the basic model of the previous section, a constant wage can be the optimal way to induce an executive to pursue shareholder interests even though everyone knows that she would never be detected by taking an action that yields greater nonpecuniary utility.
Equilibrium
Given the support for the probability distributions of output and taste shocks, all outcomes and job-match choices are consistent with the belief that no executive has ever shirked. Thus, job matches and output realizations cannot serve as signals. However, executives could conceivably signal their level of human capital through the contracts they o er. Theorem 5.3 embeds the market-clearing condition (5.15) within a noncooperative game. Since it contains only one subgame, comprising the entire game, we adopt the sequential equilibrium re nement to characterize behavior. 17 The optimal long-term contract cannot be implemented as a sequence of short-term contracts in the extended model. In the extended model, shirking in the current period a ects the rm's current and future returns, directly through F jk , and also indirectly because incentive compatibility might not be achieved in the future because h 6 = h 0 in all future periods. A long-term contract punishing executives for poor past rm performance has a deterrent e ect as executives contemplate their future compensation, to be used in conjunction with immediate punishment, thus endowing shareholders with additional nancial tools to induce incentive compatibility. We interpret the optimal one-period contract derived in this paper in the extended model as an economically meaningful departure from the null hypothesis of ignoring career concerns entirely.
Theorem 5.3 A sequential equilibrium with one-period contracts exists with expected compensation equal to the marginal productivity of an executive who has never shirked:
Executives with characteristics (t; h; h 0 ) solve the discrete choice problem (5.6), and o er the cost-minimizing contract speci ed in equation (5.12) for executives with characteristics (t; h 0 ; h 0 ). Shareholders accept such o ers, but would reject any other o er because they believe executives making such o ers have shirked and are now incapable of making pro ts for the rm. Along the equilibrium path, the conditional-choice probabilities solving (5.6) satisfy the market-clearing condition (5.15) and executives never shirk, so h 0 = h.
A detailed description of strategies and beliefs on and o the equilibrium path is relegated to the appendix with the proof. We construct a sequential equilibrium in which executives sequentially expropriate all the rent that can be extracted from one-period contracts. Along the equilibrium path, executives work every period, so h = h 0 for all t. If the executive shirks, h 6 = h 0 , and the variable pay components, designed for reputation h 0 , do not necessarily align the incentives of shareholders with those of the executive who is o the equilibrium path. Having deviated from the equilibrium path by shirking once, it may be optimal for a executive to shirk at some future time, as equation (5.4) indicates. One possibility not accommodated by the construction of B t (h; h 0 ) is an executive who has always shirked, attempting to confess during her negotiations with shareholders. What happens if she o ers a contract in the ultimatum game that di ers from w jk;t+1 (h 0 ; ), such as w jk;t+1 (h; )? In the equilibrium we construct, shareholders interpret any deviation from w jk;t+1 (h 0 ; ) as proof the executive has shirked initially and is therefore a liability to the rm because their marginal product is bounded above by F . This assumption e ectively truncates behavior o the equilibrium path because given the shareholders' beliefs, it is a best response of an executive who has shirked to demand w jk;t+1 (h 0 ; ) and follow the continuation path implied by B t (h; h 0 ).
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Because the incentive compatibility condition is cheaper to enforce in the extended model, the total amount of surplus available for division between employee and employer is higher when shareholders employ executives with career concerns due to a lower risk premium, compared with employing executives whose human capital would evolve independently of their e ort. Certainty-equivalent pay also di ers across the two models because the investment value of job matches is di erent.
To illustrate, suppose career concerns are exogenously introduced into just one type of job match { say, because the technology of capital accumulation changes from (4.4) to (5.1). Some executives who previously spurned this job match in favor of another option, such as retirement, now take it, because the reduced risk premium absorbs a smaller portion of the marginal product, more than o setting the negative e ects of the idiosyncratic shock that previously deterred them. Thus, the primary e ect of this change in technology is to increase the equilibrating value of the nonpecuniary loss for the marginal executive, thereby increasing the number of executives taking that particular job match rather than pursuing other options. There is, however, a secondary e ect. With higher certainty-equivalent pay coming from the introduction of career concerns in this particular job match, which is chosen with strictly positive probability at some future date, the investment value of all job matches increases. In equilibrium executives extract all the surplus, so a higher investment value ratchets up the nonpecuniary loss an executive is willing to incur when the new technology is introduced, reducing the probability of retirement.
Example. All the di erences between the basic model and the extension trace back to reputation h 0 , the choice probabilities for retirement morphing from p 0t (h) into p 0t (h; h 0 ) ; and the value of human capital from
The equilibrium contract in the extension is specied in terms of h 0 ; regardless of whether the executive is on the equilibrium path, but the variability in (5.16) ultimately arises from ; which is generated by h; not h 0 . Similarly, the xed component of pay, F jk (h 0 ), depends on h 0 , but nonpecuniary bene ts depend on h: The variable component of pay in the basic model, de ned by (4.22) and (4.23), is computed without recourse to recursion. However, when there are career concerns, this component and the associated multiplier are computed recursively because they depend on future retirement probabilities, denoted by p 0;t+1 (h 0 + jk ; h 0 + jk ) and p 0;t+1 h 0 + jk ; h 0 + jk . Thus (5.10) simpli es to
where B (h 0 ), de ned by (5.11), solves
We modify the analog to W jkt (h; b ) de ned for the basic model in (4.27) to account for situations in which h 6 = h 0 :
;t+1 (h; h 0 ; ) : To interpret (5.18), note that nonpecuniary losses from (j; k) ; captured by jkt (h); depend on actual human capital, the investment value of the job depends on the upper term in the square brackets, while certaintyequivalent pay, The recursion to derive the equilibrium choice probabilities exploits the fact that in the period immediately preceding retirement, the investment value of a job is zero and there are no career concerns. Thus, in period t = T 1 both models have the same solution:
(i) For each executive, set t = T 1. Follow Steps (i) and (ii) in the equilibrium construction of the basic model, solving for A (h) with equation (4.23) and then computing w 
IDENTIFICATION
Our data consist of matched panel data on rms and their executives in di erent time periods, consisting of job-match choices d jkt over the rms j and ranks k, compensation w jkt indexed by age t, executive demographic information and employment histories h it ; excess rm returns j indexed by calendar time ; and bond prices b , again indexed by calendar time. The basic model is characterized by its preference and technology parameters. The preference parameters include the coe cient of risk aversion , the disutility from working jkt (h t ), the disutility from shirking jkt (h t ); and an idiosyncratic taste shock associated with each job match G(" t ). The technology parameters are the marginal product of work F jk (h), the probability density function of excess returns when every executive works, f j ( ); and the likelihood ratio g jk ( jh t ) that essentially de nes the density f j ( )g jk ( jh t ) when everybody except from one executive in rank k at rm j works, and the human-capital transition function H jk (h): The extended model has one additional parameter, H jk (h); the human-capital transition associated with shirking.
There are potentially two situations to investigate, depending on whether or not it is optimal to pay executives a constant wage. The latter arises when career concerns are so pronounced that the incentive-compatibility constraint is not binding, meaning (5.9) is satis ed, or when the cost-minimizing risk premium is so high relative to the net losses from shirking that executives are optimally paid to shirk. All the executives in our data receive compensation awards that depend on excess rm returns, leading us to focus on the former situation, when it is optimal for executives to work because the incentive-compatibility constraint is met with equality in equilibrium.
We assume the data are generated by an equilibrium in which every executive works. Thus, F jk (h) is identi ed from the conditional expectation of w jk;t+1 on d jkt , h t , and t using the rent extraction condition equation (5.15); f j ( ) is identi ed from observations on j ; while H jk (h) is identi ed from the empirical distribution of h t+1 at t + 1 conditional on d jkt and h it at t. Since Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have shown that the distribution of unobserved idiosyncractic shocks is not identi ed nonparametrically in dynamic discrete choice models, we assume G (" t ) is known. This leaves only , jkt (h t ), jkt (h t ), g jk ( jh t ) and H jk (h) to identify. To explain our identi cation and estimation strategy, we notate jkt (h t ); the shirking parameter, by A jkt (h t ) jkt (h t ) when the data are generated by the basic model, and by B jkt (h t ) jkt (h t ) when the data are generated by the extension.
Our approach to identi cation mimics the one we used to explain the model. First, we analyze identi cation of and jkt (h t ), the preference parameters that generate the job-match choices observed in the data, when (i) the equilibrium choice is to work each period and (ii) the compensation schedule inducing the e ort choice is given. This part of the model establishes identi cation in dynamic Roy models where there is human capital accumulation. Then we turn to the agency issues arising from moral hazard in the basic model, showing how A jkt (h t ) and g jk ( jh t ) are identi ed. The last part deals with career concerns developed in the extension; we show , jkt (h t ) and g jk ( jh t ) are identi ed in exactly the same manner as in the basic model and then focus on the remaining primitives, H jk (h) and B jkt (h t ).
Sorting over Job Matches
The conditional-choice probability (CCP) vector, p t (h), is identi ed by the conditional expectation of d ijk , on (h i ; t i ; b ). Hotz and Miller (1993, p. 501) show that if G (" t ) is known, there exist known mappings
that can be written as a known function of p t (h). Exponentiating equation (4.15) and then raising it to the power of 1=b yields
(6.1) Now, substituting ' jk [p t (h) ; b ] for E[exp( " jkt =b )] and the right-hand side of equation (6.1) for the left in equation (4.9) yields a representation for A t (h; b ) in terms of the CCP vector p t (h):
Equation (6.3) is an equilibrium sorting condition characterized by q jk [p t (h)] that, with reference to (4.15), accounts for certainty equivalent pay, the value of human capital A t+1 p t+1 H jk (h) ; b +1 , a shrinkage factor that raises the value of job matches, and a market-clearing condition captured by q jk [p t (h)] that equilibrates the idiosyncratic individual taste disturbances. The compensation schedules o ered by di erent ranks and rms can be interpreted as choices over lotteries with di erent nonpecuniary characteristics. Thus, (6.3) can be used to identify both jkt (h t ) and when exclusion restrictions exist that limit the dependence of the taste parameters on variables the help determine the contract. De ne z jkt (h; b ; b +1 ) as some components of (j; k; t; h; b ) a ect z jkt (h; b ; b +1 ) but neither nor jkt (h). Note that all the elements in (j; k; t; h; b ) belong to the information set of the executive at the beginning of each age period t that a ects her choices. This can be ascertained by checking for variation in the CCP vector. Hence, they qualify as valid instruments if they do not a ect preferences as well. For example, human capital is a candidate for an exclusion restriction.
20 Similarly, b is a valid instrument if, as we later assume, and jkt (h) are independent of the aggregate state of the economy.
Let x denote a vector of instruments constructed from (h; j; k; b ) for each observation, and de ne the unconditional density of as f ( ). Substituting z jkt (h; b ; b +1 ) into (6.3), rearranging to make z jkt (h; b ; b +1 ) the subject of the equation, and taking expectations conditional on x yields
Thus, and jkt (h) are identi ed from the conditional expectations function (6.5), thus establishing identi cation of the basic model up to G (" t ) :
Moral Hazard in the Basic Model
From the data the equilibrium compensation schedule, w jk;t+1 (h t ; ), is identi ed by the conditional expectation of individual observations of compensation on (d jkt ; j ; h t ; t; b ).
21 The nite-upper-bound property of r jk;t+1 (h; ) in equation (4.24) and the optimal compensation schedule in equation (5.12) imply that compensation is bounded and the executive's maximum compensation is lim !1 w jk;t+1 (h; ) = w A jk;t+1 (h) + r jk;t+1 (h) w jk;t+1 (h).
(6.6) Thus, w jk;t+1 (h t ) is identi ed by the maximum of w jk;t+1 conditional on (d jkt ; h t ; t; b ). Theorem 6.1 adapts Theorem 2.1 of to incorporate human-capital accumulation and sorting in our model. It demonstrates that, in equilibrium, g jk ( jh t ) is a mapping of the identi ed functions p t (h), w jk;t+1 (h t ; ); w jk;t+1 (h t ); and . Intuitively, (6.7) shows g jk ( jh t ) is identi ed from the curvature of w jkt+1 (h t ; ). Having identi ed the working preference parameter jkt (h t ) from (6.3) and the likelihood ratio g jk ( jh t ) from (6.7), the shirking preference parameter A jkt (h t ) is now identi ed from the incentive-compatibility constraint (4.21), which holds with equality when compensation varies with :
Career Concerns in the Extended Model
It is instructive to highlight the similarities and di erences between the basic and extended models in identication by de ning, for the extended model, a virtual shirking parameter as
where 1fprivateg denotes an indicator function taking a value of 1 if human capital is private (as in the extension), and zero if not (the basic model). Substituting jkt (h) for A jkt (h) and B t (h; h) for A t (h) throughout the previous 20 In this paper, we assume that (i) is independent of an executive's human capital and (ii) that the nonpecuniary cost of switching rms or ranks does not depend on some dimension of human-capital accumulation. In estimation, we use previous ranks as an instrument.
21 In this way, we allow for observations on compensation to be measured with independent error. subsection demonstrates, by exactly the same logic, that , g jk ( jh); jkt (h); and jkt (h) are identi ed up to G (" t ) in the extended model. We exploit this fact in estimation. The only remaining question is whether H jk (h) and B jkt (h) can be identi ed from the virtual shirking parameter jkt (h), which is itself identi ed but is clearly not a primitive. Imagine the data are generated by the extended model and substitute the virtual parameter jkt (h) de ned in equation (6.9), the incentivecompatibility constraint for the extended model, into equation (5.8). This gives the incentive-compatibility constraint for the basic model, (4.21), with jkt (h) replacing A jkt (h). Neither (4.14) nor (4.15) depend on A jkt (h) or the information structure because the executive works in the equilibrium of both models. Replacing jkt (h) with A jkt (h) and B t (h; h;b ) for A t (h;b ); it is straightforward to check that with these changes the solution for the extension solves the optimal contract problem for the basic model, which is given by equations (4.22), (4.23), and (4.25). This argument suggests that data generated by models with private information inducing career concerns are di cult to distinguish from data generated by models that do not have career concerns. Speci cally, jkt (h) indexes observationally equivalent models that di er only in their speci cation of H jk (h) and jkt (h).
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Theorem 6.2 Let denote the class of models under consideration, consisting of elements
Suppose b = b for all and (w ijk ; d ijk ; j ; h i ; t i ) is generated by e . For every b > 0 and all proper probability distribution functions b G(") de ned on the same support as e G("), there exists a unique b solving equations (5.6), (5.12), (5.15), (6.3), (6.7), and (6.9) that is observationally equivalent to e .
Imposing exclusion restrictions on preferences or the technology of human capital accumulation does, however, distinguish the basic model from the extension. To illustrate, consider the following three restrictions:
(i) Suppose (h) for all t, and there is a maximum retirement age T . Recalling that at age T there is no investment value from human capital or career concerns, then
In this case, the shirking parameter is identi ed from (6.9) and after substituting B t (h; h; b ) for A t (h; b ) equation (6.8) as:
Intuitively, the basic and extended models have exactly the same predictions if the executive is of age T 1 and has not shirked before, so the distinction between A jk (h) and B jk (h) is moot. Having identi ed B jk (h); the continuation value associated with shirking the rst time is also identi ed from (6.9) for all t T 2 as
In this way, the importance of career concerns at younger ages can be compared by showing how the identied continuation value of shirking for the rst time varies over the lifecycle. Note that the basic model does have empirical content against the extension that nests it: Under the null hypothesis of no career concerns,
(ii) Similarly, suppose jkt (h) is independent of aggregate shocks in the economy, more speci cally, bond prices b . In this case, given (j; k; t; h) and two bond prices b 0 6 = b 00 , equation (6.9) yields two equations in three unknowns { namely, B jkt (h), B t+1 H jk (h); H jk (h); b 0 , and B t+1 H jk (h); H jk (h); b 00 . Relative to the normalization B t+1 H jk (h); H jk (h); b 0 = 1, the other two parameters are identi ed.
(iii) If H jk (h) is known, then B t+1 H jk (h); H jk (h); b +1 can be numerically calculated in recursive fashion starting from t = T using equation (5.4). The parameter B jkt (h) now follows from (6.9).
ESTIMATION
In our empirical framework, we assume throughout that " t is distributed as a type 1 extreme value. The computational advantages of parameterizing G(") in this manner are evident from the formulas for A t (h; b ) and B t (h; h 0 ; b ) in equation (5.7) and the expression for q jk [p t (h)] in equation (4.18). On and o the equilibrium path, the human-capital transition functions are deterministic; see equations (4.4) and (5.2) for H jk (h) and H jk (h), respectively. We use a four step procedure, which directly follows the approach of our identi cation strategy, to estimate and test our models:
(i) Flexibly estimate w jkt ( ; h), w jkt (h), f j ( ), f ( ), H jk (h), and p jkt (h).
(ii) Estimate and jkt (h) from sample moments formed from population moments implied by (6.5), replacing w jkt ( ; h), w jkt (h), f j ( ), f ( ), H jk (h); and p jkt (h) with their estimates obtained from Step 1. (iii) Use the formulas from equations (6.7) and (6.8) to estimate g jk ( jh ) and A jkt (h) by replacing with its estimate from Step 2 and w jkt ( ; h), w jkt (h), f j ( ), H jk (h); and p jkt (h) with their estimates from Step 1. (iv) Numerically calculate B t+1 H jk (h); H jk (h); b +1 recursively, assuming that jkt (h) is independent of b and that H jk (h) is known, and test the implied overidentifying restrictions. An alternative estimation strategy is to exploit the equilibrium computation algorithm outlined at the end of Section 5.6. It involves computing a nested xed-point algorithm to calculate (h; b ) and B t+1 H jk (h); H jk (h); b +1 for di erent values of the primitives in an inner loop, and using the results from the inner loop to estimate the primitives of the model in an outer loop. This alternative strategy is not only computationally burdensome but in practical applications is also somewhat obscure. It also requires a fully parametric speci cation of f j ( ), g jk ( jh ) and F jk ( jh ). In our paper, all these parameters are nonparametrically estimated. Another advantage of the estimation strategy used above is that it allows us to impose the di erent identi cation restrictions only when needed: For example, the restrictions needed to identify B t+1 H jk (h); H jk (h); b +1 are imposed only when we estimate the e ects of career concerns.
Step 1. The state space for the dynamic system is the Cartesian product of the executive's age, t, and personal background, h t 2 f1; : : : ; Hg; at the beginning of each period, as well as a vector that includes her employer rm during the last period, j t 1 2 f1; : : : ; 36g, management rank last period, k t 1 2 f0; 1; : : : ; 5g, xed components (such as cohort, gender, and education), and other variable components (such as measures of executive experience). Job matches in our model follow a stochastic law of motion, p jkt (h t ) and p 0t (h t ). We estimate a multinomial logit model of rm type and position transitions with some (but not all) interactions for exit, promotions, and turnover. In estimation, we exploit Bayes' rule: Given background h, the (joint) probability, p jkt (h t ), is the product of the probability of choosing the j th rm conditional on choosing the k th rank, and the (marginal) probability of choosing Rank k. The compensation schedule, w jkt( ) ( ; h), is estimated using a polynomial, and the boundary condition, w jkt( ) (h), is estimated using the maximum of w jkt( ) ( ; h) over . Finally, f j ( ) and f ( ) are estimated using kernel density estimators with normal kernel and the Silverman rule of thumb for the bandwidth.
Step 2. To estimate and jkt (h), we exploit the exclusion restrictions discussed in the identi cation section by forming population moments from the conditional expectation function (6.5):
Upon substituting (4.15) and (5.7) into (6.4), z jkt (h) simpli es to
We approximate z jkt (h) by substituting the Step 1 estimates of the conditional-choice probabilities, p 0t (h), p jkt (h) and p 0;t+1 H jk (h) into (7.2). Sample analogs for the CCP vector, the compensation schedule, and conditional and unconditional densities of the abnormal return from Step 1 are substituted into Equation (7.1). Consistent estimates of and jkt (h) are then obtained from the approximate sample moments along with (consistent estimates of their) standard errors adjusted for the pre-estimation. We specify jkt (h) as a log-linear function of age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, executive experience, executive experience squared, number of employers before becoming an executive, number of employers after becoming an executive, and indicators for board membership, interlocked, no college degree, MBA, MS/MA, PhD, and gender. We estimate an unrestricted version of the model that allows jkt (h) and to be fully interacted with rank and rm type. This allows us to test whether is a function of rm size, a possibility that might arise if our assumption of absolute risk aversion is violated (Baker and Hall, 2004) . We interact these 16 variables with rank and rm type to form jkt (h). We also permit the risk-aversion parameter to vary by the 36 rm types, but not by rank. In total, there are (16 5 + 1) 36 = 2;916 parameters to be estimated. Equation (7.1) yields an orthogonal condition for each rank and rm combination, giving 5 36 = 180 moment conditions. In addition to the variables a ecting jkt (h), we use bond prices and the lag of Ranks 1 through 4 as instruments, adding another 5 20 36 = 3;600 moment conditions. After rejecting the null hypothesis that varies with rm size, we impose these and other nonrejected restrictions on the results and reestimate the model. These restrictions are a common for all rm types and that the e ect of rank and rm type in jkt (h) is additive. This reduces the number of parameters to (16 36 + 5 16 + 1) = 657. We obtain similar results from both the restricted and unrestricted versions; hence, only the restricted version is reported.
Step 3. We form b w(h t ; ), the nonparametric estimates of the compensation schedule, as a polynomial expansion from Step 1, using them in conjunction with our estimate of the risk-aversion parameter obtained from Step 2. We approximate the conditional expectation,
, by integration using the nonparametrically estimated density of for a given j, from Step 1, and compute w jk;t+1 (h) using the maximum b w (h t ; ) for each value of (j; k; t; h). Finally, our estimate of g jk ( jh) is obtained by substituting our estimates of w jk;t+1 (h), and E t [v jk;t+1 ( ; )] into equation (6.7). The sample analog of the CCP vector, b w(h t ; ),and the estimates of g jk ( jh) are now substituted into a sample average of equation (6.8) to obtain an estimate for A jkt (h), which is jkt (h) in the extended model
Step 4. In (6.8), we replace A jkt (h) with jkt (h); and substitute (5.7), the formula for B t (h; h 0 ; b ) under type I extreme values, for A t (h; b ) to obtain an expression for jkt (h) in the extended model. The resulting expression replaces jkt (h) in equation (6.9), and using the log-odds form of q jk [p t (h)] ; we rearrange the equation to obtain
for all (j; k; t; h). Estimates of 
PAY DIFFERENTIALS IN THE EXECUTIVE LABOR MARKET
This section presents our estimates of di erent components comprising the sources of pay di erentials across ranks and rms in the executive labor market. Expected compensation is the sum of certainty-equivalent pay and a risk premium. First, we report on the estimated risk premium and the coe cient of risk aversion, from which it is derived. Then we decompose certainty-equivalent pay into three additive components, arising from compensating variation in utility, due to permanent and idiosyncratic job and executive characteristics, plus the investment value of the job in developing human capital. All the results in this section, plus the results on the span of control discussed in the next section, can be interpreted within the context of either model. As foreshadowed in our analysis of identi cation, only the results on career concerns explicitly draw on the extension. Following the precedent set in the previous sections, we revert to the notation for the extended model only when we discuss our results on career concerns.
The Risk Premium
The risk premium is a compensating di erential to risk-averse executives for bearing risk in the form of rm-denominated securities. In our model, it is measured by the di erence between expected compensation and certainty equivalent pay de ned in equation (4.19). From (4.26) expected compensation is the expected value of the executive's marginal product:
In our model, r jkt (h) measures the cost of agency. Note that since the executive works in equilibrium, even in the extended model r jkt (h) does not directly depend on H jk (h), jkt (h), or B t+1 ( ), terms that characterize what occurs to human capital, utility, and the continuation value if the executive shirks. Thus, r jkt (h) is computed the same way in both models.
Variation in compensation across rm size and rank. Figure 3 presents the components of expected pay decomposition by rm size and rank, evaluated at the median bond price for the sample, and averaged over the other characteristics. The risk premium accounts for most of the variation in pay across ranks and rms of di erent sizes. Figure 3A shows that expected compensation is greater in large rms and in higher ranks (up to Rank 2) because the risk premium has the same pattern. Indeed, the magnitude and di erentials in the risk premium dominate expected pay so much that the di erence between them, certainty-equivalent pay, falls with rm size. Table 3 reports more detail on our estimates of r jkt (h). At Ranks 4 and 5, r jkt (h) is small and insigni cant in small rms, but it adjusts to $1.5 million, $3.3 million, and $1 million for Ranks 3, 2, and 1 respectively. Roughly 82 percent of the compensation of a Rank 2 executive, versus 72 percent for Rank 1, 76 percent for Rank 3, 65 percent for Rank 4, and 69 percent for Rank 5, is due to the risk premium. The service sector pays a higher risk premium than the other two, a factor that helps close the gap between the considerably higher levels of average compensation paid in that sector and those reported in Table 3 . With regard to rm size, on average an executive in a small rm receives $1.6 million in risk premium (56 percent of expected compensation), $2.8 million in a medium-size rm (85 percent of expected compensation), and $4.8 million in a large rm (90 percent of expected compensation).
Coe cient of risk aversion. The coe cient of risk aversion plays a vital role in estimating the risk premium. Not only does that parameter directly a ect the optimal contract in the theory, but it also plays a critical role in identi cation and in estimation. For these reasons we examined the robustness of the estimates of the coe cient of risk aversion and compared them with previous published estimates. We initially speci ed the risk aversion parameter as a function of gender and rm size, but at the 1 percent level could not reject the null hypothesis that male and female executives and executives sorting into rms of di erent size and sector have the same coe cient of risk aversion. Our estimate of the risk-aversion parameter for all groups is 0.534 with a standard error of 0.152 for compensation measured in millions of 2006 $US. For example, an executive with risk aversion parameter of 0.534 would be willing to pay $255,199 to avoid a gamble that has an equal probability of losing or winning 1 million dollars. Gayle and Miller (2009b) found a risk aversion parameter of 0.501 using data on 37 rms for the period 1944{1978 and 0.519 using data on 151 rms for the period 1993{2004. Our estimate of risk aversion is generally lower than those found in laboratory experiments and eld studies Laury, 2002, 2005; Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and Rutstr• om, 2005; Harrison, List, and Towe, 2007; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstr• om, 2008; Dohmen, Falk, Hu man, and Sunde, 2010) . This discrepancy is plausible because those with greater risk tolerance are more likely to accept jobs that entail greater risk, and executive compensation is much more volatile than wages in most occupations.
Certainty-Equivalent Pay
From equation (4.19), certainty-equivalent pay factors into three additive components:
where jkt (h) is a compensating di erential due to the nonpecuniary utility gain or loss incurred by working in (j; k) relative to the outside option, A jkt (h) is the investment value of (j; k) from accumulating human capital, and q jkt (h) is a compensating di erential that induces selection on the unobserved idiosyncratic preference shocks:
Note that both jkt (h) and q jkt (h) have static analogs; q jk [p t (h; h)] is the value of the disturbance " jkt " 0t that makes the marginal executive in (j; k) indi erent between that position and her outside option at marketclearing pay. Inframarginal executives making the same (j; k) choice, who have higher values of " jkt " 0t but are otherwise identical to the marginal executive, garner producer surplus in equilibrium. Following the literature, we call q jk [p t (h; b )] the demand e ect. The only structural parameters needed to estimate the certainty equivalent and its decomposition that cannot be estimated nonparametrically are jkt (h) and . The other ingredients, the choice probabilities, the compensation schedule, and the distribution of abnormal return, are all estimated nonparametrically.
Firm size and rank. Our discussion of Figure 3A foreshadowed the most striking result of Figure 3B : Certainty-equivalent pay decreases with rm size. To interpret the histograms in Figures 3B and 3C , the human capital and demand pieces below zero reduce certainty equivalent pay and, therefore, should be subtracted from the nonpecuniary pieces above zero to obtain total certainty-equivalent pay. Thus, average certainty-equivalent pay of an executive in a small rm is $780,000, falling to $430,000 for a medium-size rm and to $390,000 for a large rm. The discount for the value of human-capital accumulation does not vary appreciably with rm size, and larger rms have a greater demand e ect; higher compensating di erentials are paid to attract the marginal executive hired to meet demand. However, these two factors are overwhelmed by a third one: Small rms in ict greater nonpecuniary losses on executives than large rms.
In addition to the negative relationship between rm size and nonpecuniary bene t from working, the distribution of ranks across rm size, as demonstrated in Figure 1B , contributes to the di erence between the average compensation and the certainty equivalent by rm size. Figure 3C shows that certainty-equivalent pay is concave over ranks, lowest in Rank 5; $570,000, increasing monotonically to $900,000 in Rank 2, before declining to $690,000 in Rank 1. Thus, Rank 3 executives have higher certainty-equivalent pay, $730,000, than Rank 1 executives, but Rank 1 executives have slightly higher certainty-equivalent pay than Rank 4 executives, $660,000. This ordering follows that of the average total compensation by executive rank reported in Table  1 , which ranges from $1,269,000 (for Rank 5) to $4,794,000 (for Rank 2), and the compression of certainty equivalent pay mirrors the outsized role of the risk premium.
The demand e ect, is lowest for Rank 5, highest for Rank 4, and then declines through to Rank 1. Similarly, Table 8A in the supplementary appendix shows that compared to small rms, medium sized rms pay an additional $32,000 and large rms an extra $170,000 to attract executives that experience greater idiosyncratic disutility from employment. There is a trade-o between higher xed pay to executives with career concerns and higher risk premiums to those who lack them. In equilibrium, large rms o er greater certainty-equivalent pay to attract the type of executives who can be induced to work for less variable pay with a lower compensating risk premium, rather than paying an even higher risk premium to attract those types of executives who require more variable pay to meet the incentive-compatibility constraint.
Investment value. The lifecycle theory of human capital predicts that as executives age, human-capital investment becomes less important. In support of the theory, Table 1 shows higher ranks are held by older executives with more executive experience, and the value of human-capital investment decreases with all measures of experience. However, Figure 3C also shows that executives give up more compensation for human capital investment as they progress through the ranks until they reach Rank 1, where the trend falls o . In our model, the investment value of human capital is inversely related to the probability of exit. This pattern is re ected in the exit probability, which from Table 2 is lowest in Rank 2, highest in Rank 1, and is lower in larger rms. Intuitively, the e ective discount factor used to compute the value of human capital, in terms of summed future increased earnings within the occupation, must account for the probability of exit.
Consequently, standard models of human capital, in which everybody retires at the same age, overpredict human-capital investment in the lower ranks and underpredict investment in higher ranks. As a fraction of the certainty-equivalent wage, the value of human capital is bracketed between approximately one-quarter and one-half of total compensation, remarkably high given the distribution of ages, positions, and the lengths of future careers. This new nding on human-capital investment pairs with another: Even late in the career cycle, variety in job experience adds to human capital, and the value of human capital is higher in large rms. Our ndings suggest that in the top ranks of executive management, general human capital might increase from gaining management experience in di erent environments.
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The role of education, tenure, and rank composition. We also investigated several other factors that might help explain the pay di erential in executive compensation between small and large rms. In our framework, expected compensation is the executive's marginal product. Consequently, we interpret executives with a PhD, who receive an average expected compensation of $3.0 million, as being more productive on average than those with an MBA, $2.7 million, and those without either, $2.8 million. An executive with a PhD receives a higher risk premium, $2.3 million, than one with an MBA, $2.1 million, but an executive with a PhD receives a smaller fraction of expected compensation in the form of a risk premium than an executive with an MBA, 76 percent versus 78 percent. There is a $362,000 spike in the risk premium for new executives, but it declines by $65,000 with each extra year of tenure and age. Consequently, the lower certainty-equivalent wage o ered to rst-year executives is partially hidden by data on their average compensation. Because larger rms have more executives with MBA degrees and fewer tenured executives, both ndings overstate the rm-size pay premium in the raw data. Finally, the overall e ect of the interaction with rm size and rank is ambiguous. For example, the e ect of Rank 1 overstates the e ect of rm size while the e ect of Rank 5 understates it. In summary, these other factors, albeit signi cant, are too small in magnitude to rationalize the pay di erential in executive compensation between rms of di erent sizes.
AGENCY COSTS AND FIRM SIZE
Our empirical ndings show the risk premium largely explains why mean executive compensation in large rms is higher than small rms, in the process revealing the surprising result that certainty-equivalent pay is higher in small rms than large ones. The premium, however, is not itself a primitive of the model, but given an equilibrium, a mapping from the technology and preference parameters. In this section, we investigate why the risk premium is so much higher in large rms, by turning to the agency issues that produce it. We report on two measures of the relative contribution of di erent sources to the overall agency cost to show how they vary with rm size. The rst is the gross loss to shareholders from an executive unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium by shirking; we interpret this measure as her span of control. The second is the bene t an executive would extract from shirking for one period, leaving aside its e ect on compensation she receives that period.
Span of Control
First used in Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Miller (2009a,b, 2015) , the di erence in the expected abnormal return to rm j, generated by every executive working, versus everyone except a single rank k executive working, is given by
It is measured by the gross output loss to the rm from switching from f j ( ), the density of abnormal returns obtained from everyone working, to its shirking counterpart, f j ( )g jk ( jh ). To obtain the gross loss to shareholders, we rst estimate the likelihood ratio of working versus shirking, g jk ( ; h); a part of the production technology de ned in Section 4.5. The likelihood ratio g jk ( jh ) is not just a technology parameter. It also shapes the signal used by shareholders to enforce incentive compatibility (equation (4.21)) through the variable component of equilibrium compensation (equation (4.25) ) and, hence, can be identi ed from the curvature with respect to abnormal returns (equation (6.7)). Theorem 6.1 establishes that identifying g jk ( jh ) and g jkt (h) does not depend on aggregate conditions, bond prices b ; or the aggregate return . Our estimates of g jk ( jh ) and g jkt (h) are robust to the speci cation of H jk (h); they are not a ected by whether or not human capital evolves with e ort. Figure 4 shows (with Table 4 providing greater detail) that small consumer-sector rms lose 33.6 percent of their equity value when a Rank 5 executive shirks, but large rms lose much less, 8 percent. This contrasts with a nding by Baker and Hall (2004) , whose estimates imply constant loss across rm size. Intuitively, shirking executives in small rms cause signi cantly more damage than they would in large rms because an executive in a smaller rm has a greater marginal impact on each unit of equity than any one executive working for a large rm. There is also a positive relationship between rm size and the expected gross loss in equity from shirking. Multiplying our estimates by the average equity value gives gross equity losses of $102 million for a small rm, $203 million for a medium-size one, and $393 million for a large one. The gross loss in equity value from shirking would be higher in large rms; therefore, the agency cost is concave increasing with rm size.
Turning to rank, the most surprising result from Table 4 is that g jkt (h) monotonically declines in rank. When a Rank 1 executive in a large rm shirks, only a small proportion of equity value is lost. Similarly, the extent of destruction is lower for higher lagged ranks. These ndings overturn the conventional wisdom that shareholders risk more from chairmen and CEOs who shirk than lower-ranked o cers; our results are consistent with the view that executives closer to the rm's operations can wreak the most havoc and therefore the excess return of the rm is a better signal of their e ort. The losses are greatest in the service sector and least in the primary sector.
Interpreted as a measure of signal quality, the atter the g jk ( jh), the less information it conveys. Figures  5A and 5B show the strength of the signal weakens with both rm size and executive rank. Thus, a chairman of a large rm receives more variable compensation and is consequently paid a larger risk premium, because she has less control and thus transmits a weaker signal of her e ort than a lower-ranked executive employed in a small rm who is closer to operations and therefore more directly accountable, and hence transmits a stronger signal about e ort, thus reducing the cost of achieving incentive compatibility. For this reason, the chairman of a large rm receives a larger risk premium than a lower-ranked executive in a small rm.
Career Concerns
Aside from issues related to current compensation, executives weigh two other factors when making the e ort decision in the extended model. The rst, denoted by jkt (h), is the compensating di erential for current utility when the executive weighs shirking against working, the value an executive places on shirking over working:
As such, jkt (h) measures the misalignment of preferences from the executive's perspective and also applies to models of moral hazard without career concerns, including our basic model in Section 4. 24 Substituting jkt (h) for jkt (h) in (4.19), the certainty-equivalent pay equation, highlights the monetized value of shirking over working. The second, B jkt (h), measures the di erence in the continuation value from working in the currentperiod t versus shirking. It measures by how much career concerns ameliorate the agency problem:
This e ect is best seen in (5.8), the incentive compatibility constraint for the extended model (which holds with equality in equilibrium). Hence, the net bene t to the executive from shirking can be expressed as a sum:
Our estimates for jkt (h) apply equally to both models; from Equation (6.9) the estimates for jkt (h) are valid for jkt (h) obtained for the basic model. More generally, all the preceding empirical results and those for jkt (h) apply without quali cation to both the basic model and its extension. The net bene t from shirking, jkt (h), is identi ed from data on choice probabilities, the compensation schedule, the abnormal return distribution, the risk aversion parameter, and the likelihood ratio. (Replacing A jkt (h t ) with jkt (h) equation (6.8) refers.) Therefore, jkt (h) is identi ed without appealing to the functional form assumptions about H jk (h); which are the basis for career concerns in our model, or exclusion restrictions. However, the observational equivalence between the basic and extended models established in Theorem 6.2 implies that B jkt (h) and jkt (h) cannot be separately identi ed from jkt (h) without functional form assumptions on H jk (h); such as those given in equation (5.2), along with an exclusion restriction that jkt (h) is independent of bond prices. Table 5 reports our estimates of jkt (h) and Table 6 reports our estimates of B jkt (h). 25 Figure 4 and Table 5 show that jkt (h) declines with rm size, by $3.1 and $4.5 million for medium-sized and large rms, respectively, and di ers across sectors, $3.8 million higher in the service sector than the consumer sector, and $2.6million lower in the primary sector. It is also evident from Figure 4 and Table 6 that career concerns, B jkt (h), do not vary with rm size.
From Table 5 , jkt (h), the net bene t from shirking, is about $10 million for a 50-year-old Rank 5 executive in a small rm in the consumer sector and increasing in rank. While economically signi cant, the di erential 24 See Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2009a,b, forthcoming) for estimates of jkt (h) in models of executive compensation where career concerns are absent.
25 By subtracting the estimates in Table 6 from those in Table 5 we obtain the gross compensating di erential for working versus shirking under perfect monitoring. The estimates in Tables 5 are mainly of a higher order of magnitude than those in Table 6 . Therefore, the qualitative patterns of the gross compensating di erential for diligence versus shirking is similar to the net di erential.
across ranks is not statistically signi cant. Our estimates of B jkt (h) in Table 6 show there are signi cant career concerns at all ranks, reducing the di erential for working versus shirking by between 15 and 22 percent. As a percentage of the gross compensating di erential, it is lowest in Rank 1 and highest in Rank 3. The lower percentage in Rank 1 re ects its position at the end of the lifecycle, while the higher percentage in Rank 3 re ects the imminent possibility of promotion to CEO. There are signi cant career concerns at the CEO rank, with 19 percent of the gross compensating di erential from working versus shirking, equal to Rank 4, and higher than the 17 percent for Rank 5. Career concerns decline with age, tenure, executive experience, and experience gained from working in di erent rms. In equilibrium, variable pay is used more extensively as a tool to motivate these older, more experienced executives. Because the resulting risk premium is a deadweight loss stemming from a second-best solution, as Figure 3C shows, demand for such executives is less than for their younger, less experienced, lower-ranked counterparts, who are willing to work, as opposed to shirk, for less variable pay.
CONCLUSION
Firm size is a major source of variation in executive pay. As in other labor markets, executives in larger rms are paid more. The empirical literature supports the importance of both assignment and sorting (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) and the agency costs (Gayle and Miller, 2009b) in explaining why executive pay increases with rm size. Our equilibrium framework incorporates both sorting and agency considerations. This allows us to separately estimate the share of the compensation due to agency and the certainty equivalent wage determined by equilibrium sorting. In contrast to previous studies, we use a hierarchy (constructed in Gayle, Golan, and Miller, 2012) to account for ranks as a source of variation in pay. We nd that most of the variation of pay in rm size is due to the agency problem. A more surprising result, however, is that although the expected pay is higher in large rms, for a given skill set, the certainty-equivalent wage decreases in rm size. We further decompose the certainty-equivalent wage to quantify the di erent sources of pay variation. We nd that the lower certainty-equivalent pay is mainly due to the lower disutility associated with diligent work in larger rms. The expected pay increases with rank, and the certainty equivalent is increasing and concave in rank. However, we nd that a risk premium explains most of the variation in pay across ranks.
To explain the variation in the risk premium by rm, rank, and executive characteristics, we estimate the costs and bene ts of shirking to the executive and to shareholders. We nd that essentially the same reason explains why the risk premium increases with rm size and rank: Executive power, or her span of control, measured in our model by the expected gross loss shareholders would incur from a shirking executive, declines signi cantly with rm size and rank. Consequently, rm excess returns, the main signal of executive labor productivity, is more closely related to the performance of operating heads below the level of CEO than to the CEO herself, and is less informative about e ort in larger rms than smaller ones (where a given executive is more likely to have a pronounced e ect on rm operations). Since weak signals tend to generate large risk premiums in equilibrium, higher-ranked executives in larger rms tend to receive higher risk premiums.
Our nding that executives closer to operations have a greater span of control than their more highly ranked superiors also speaks to the rm's organization. Our empirical results conform more closely to a theory of internal organization that resembles multilateral contractual obligations between self-interested parties (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Mirrlees, 1976) , rather than the hypothesis that the rm resembles a chain of command (Williamson,1967; Calvo and Wellisz,1980) . In the equilibrium of our model, higher expected executive pay is matched to higher value of marginal productivity, and empirically CEOs are paid the most: Perhaps they are paid to coordinate, not boss. Other features of our estimates support this contractual interpretation: Compensation falls with tenure and nonpecuniary costs rise with tenure. The increase in the risk premium with rank is not driven by the increase in the executives' net bene t from shirking: Although the loss from not providing incentives increases with rank, the di erences are not signi cant. This nding provides only weak support for the conventional wisdom that shareholders risk more from chairmen and CEOs who have greater latitude to shirk than lower-ranked o cers.
Finally, we decompose the role of implicit incentives in ameliorating the moral hazard problem. While the costs and bene ts of shirking are separately identi ed, separating the disutility of shirking from the continuation value of shirking, both of which only occur o the equilibrium path, requires either a functional form assumption on the evolution of human capital when executives shirk or an exclusion restriction, such as age-invariant preferences. Using functional form assumptions, our empirical results show that the explicit incentives increase with age because career concerns decline as executives approach retirement. But in another twist to textbook labor economics { that higher-ranked workers invest less in human capital { we nd that both the CEO and executives just one rank below her have the lowest hazard rates into retirement, which leads them to forego higher pay. In other words, they acquire more human capital, both public and private, than the subordinates farther down in the hierarchy. We proceed by induction, rst showing that the expression for the value function is true for age T , and then for all t 2 f1; : : : ; T 1g. From Proposition 1 of Margiotta and Miller (2000, p. 678) , the value function solving the consumption savings problem at retirement date T + 1; for all h in our model, in present value terms, is
Department of Economics
Suppose an executive works in rm and rank coordinate pair (j; k) at age T for one period and then is forced into mandatory retirement. After selecting job match (j; k), she chooses consumption and the next-period's endowment c T ; T +1 optimally to maximize:
subject to
Equation (15) of Margiotta and Miller (2000, p. 680) gives the value function for this problem as
De ne " jkT as the value of " jkT when (j; k) is selected at T . Integrating over " jkT and averaging over job matches (j; k) yields
where in the second line we make use of the recursive de nition of At(h) given in (4.9) and the fact that A T +1 H jk (h) = 1: The proof is completed with an induction by showing that (4.13) are true for all ages t 2 f1; : : : ; T 1g. Suppose both equations are true for all ages s 2 ft + 1; : : : ; T g. Appealing to Bellman's (1957) principle, the executive's problem at age t is to maximize 
Integrating over "t and averaging over the JK + 1 job matches and appealing to the recursive de nition of At(h) then yields (4.13) as required.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: The executive optimizes her expected lifetime utility at age t by choosing the highest-valued conditional valuation function, given by equation (A.4), of the JK job matches and retirement. The solution can be found by taking logarithms and maximizing with respect to potential job matches and retirement. Note that [ln b (at + et) =b ] is then an additive constant in all alternatives, so it drops out of the solution. Multiplying by b then completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.3:
, and,
where, for convenience, we have suppressed the dependence of ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) on (j; k; t; h) to reduce the notational clutter. where, for convenience, we have also suppressed the dependence of 0 and 1 on (j; k; h). The proof now follows directly from Proposition 3 of Margiotta and Miller (2000, p. 713{714) .
Proof of Theorem 5.1: The proof of this theorem follows from Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 by extending the choice set to e ort levels as well, and substituting Bt (h; h 0 ) for At(h) in their proofs.
Proof of Theorem 5.2: Setting
the proof now follows directly from the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.3: In this game, each executive with characteristics (t; h; h 0 ) makes a contract o er for a rank j at a single rm k of her choice, which we denote by w o jk;t+1 ( ; h0). If the shareholders accept the o er, the executive chooses her e ort, is compensated at the beginning of the next period according to the provisions in the contract, and updates her state variables according to the transitions de ned in the text. If shareholders reject the contract, the executive retires. 26 Finally, we assume (i) the executive is employed for at most T periods for some T < 1 and (ii) that the optimal contract involves working every period. The proof proceeds by setting up some notation that de nes a compensation function, and then applying the de nition of sequential equilibrium given in Kreps and Wilson (1982) , to show that the strategies of executives and shareholders are sequentially rational and that the beliefs of shareholders are consistent.
Compensation function. Appealing to the optimization problem in Theorem 5.1, de ne, for each (h; ), the probability vector p e 0t (h); : : : ; p e Jt (h) and the human-capital function B e t (h; h 0 ; b ) by successively substituting the compensation function: w e jk;t+1 ( ; h) F jkt (h) + r e jk;t+1 ( ; h) E r e jk;t+1 ( ; h) ; (A.11) for w jk;t+1 ( ; h) into the respective recursions, where r e jk;t+1 ( ; h) is de ned using equations (5.10) and (5.11). By inspection, Et[w e jk;t+1 ( ; h)jh] = F jkt (h). Prescribed strategy of executives. They choose jobs, o ers, and e ort level solving the problem described in Theorem 5.1. All executives o er w e jk;t+1 ( ; h0) regardless of their history. Shareholder beliefs and prescribed strategy. If w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h); shareholders believe the executive never shirked and h 0 = h. Alternatively, if w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) 6 = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h), shareholders believe that the executive previously shirked on t = 0 and is now tainted. In that case, shareholders update their beliefs to assign an upper bound to her human capital of F . Thus, shareholders accept the contract if w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h) but reject it otherwise. Sequential rationality. From the recursive de nition of w e jk;t +1 ( ; h) and B e t (h; h 0 ), it follows from Theorem 5.2 that w e jk;t +1 ( ; h) is the most lucrative contract in which the executive's job match choices are sequentially rational. Since every contract that would be accepted is less lucrative, the other o er is rejected, compelling her to retire, which yields less utility if it was not the optimal choice when she made her initial selection. After agreeing on a contract, it is sequentially rational for the executive to work rather than shirk because of the incentive-compatibility constraint. Therefore, the strategy of the executive is sequentially rational. Since w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h), shareholders believe with probability 1 that h = h 0 and the executive will work if the contract is 26 One can show that if the bargaining game is expanded to give executives an opportunity to make multiple o ers, either sequentially to the same rm or simultaneously to di erent rms, then a sequential equilibrium exists with the same distribution of outcomes. In this more general bargaining framework, the game tree would still state (i) what executives do if all the o ers they are permitted to make are rejected and (ii) what information shareholders have about previous rejected o ers. To deal with the added complications of multiple o ers, beliefs and strategies must be de ned for many more contingencies that occur o the equilibrium path. These include beliefs of shareholders about executives whose previous o ers have been rejected and beliefs of executives whose equilibrium o ers have been rejected by shareholders. accepted. Consequently, the shareholders believe they will make zero pro ts from accepting the contract, so it is a best response to accept the o er.
A completely mixed strategy. To demonstrate these beliefs are consistent, consider the following perturbation from the conjectured equilibrium strategy. With probability i 1 , shareholders accept a contract o er of w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) 6 = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h) and with probability i 1 ; they reject a contract o er of w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h). With probability i 1 , an executive deviates from her prescribed e ort strategy. Thus, i 1 is the probability that the executive deviates by shirking in the rst period and becomes tainted. Executives deviate from their optimal job-match choice to one of the other choices with probability i 1 , giving each of the other choices equal weight. At any period t > 1, let i 3 be the probability that an untainted executive makes a contract o er of w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) 6 = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h); and let i 1 be the probability that a tainted executive o ers w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) 6 = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h). Thus, 1 1 i t 1 is the probability that a tainted executive does not make any contract demands o the equilibrium path in the t 1 periods following the rst.
Consistency of beliefs. We let ft jl 1 ; i g denotes the probability of an executive holding employment beyond t 1 conditional on (i) shareholders following their prescribed strategy and (ii) the executive following the prescribed contract o ers after putting e ort of l 1 initially. Note that ft jl 0 ; i g depends on i because the executive may deviate o the work prescription by shirking. It is, however, straightforward to show that 0 < ft jl 0 ; i g < 1 and ft jl 0 ; i g ! ft jl 0 g 2 (0; 1) as i ! 1: Denote by Pr ftainted jw at t g the probability that an executive demanding w jk;t+1 ( ; h 0 ) 6 = w e jk;t+1 ( ; h) in period t is tainted. Appealing to Bayes' rule Pr ftaintedjw at tg = In the limit of i ! 1, this probability converges to 1 because ft j1; i g / ft j0; i g converges to a positive constant and i 3 1 i 3 i 2 to 1, thus demonstrating that the rm's beliefs are consistent.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: Following , and using the notation de ned in the proof of Theorem 4.3 take the expectation of the rst-order conditions of (A.7), and also take the limit as ! 1 to obtain the two equations:
Et v 1 jk;t+1 The proof of the theorem is completed by taking the quotient of (A.14) and (A.15), which yields (6.7).
Proof of Theorem 6.2: There are two steps to the proof. First, for any nite positive b and any probability distribution function b G(") with the same support as e G("), we de ne another parameterization, b 2 . We show that the model de ned by b generates the same data as e and is therefore observationally equivalent. Given the compensation process generated by e , and our construction in the rst step, the conditional-choice probabilities of b replicate those of e . The second step is to prove that the compensation schedule generated by b reproduces the schedule generated by e { in other words { that the contracts are the same.
To The second step follows directly from applying Theorem 2.1 of . Q.E.D. tenure and executive Experience (Exec. exp.) are measured in years; NBE (NAE) is the number of times the executive changed rms before (after) entering one of the ranks in our sample. Execdir is an indicator of whether the executive is a member of the board of directors. Note: The certainty equivalent is the sum of human capital, demand, and nonpecuniary compensating di erentials. 
Value of Equity

Loss of Equity
Note: Gross loss is the percentage of the rm value lost if an executive shirks instead of working. Loss of equity is the rm value lost if an executive shirks instead of working. Nonpecuniary bene t is the value to an executive of shirking relative to working. Career concerns measures the extent to which career concerns ameliorate the agency problem. 
